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ABSTRACT
The identification of the different factors impacting a software start-up company's
decision to pursue an alliance, acquisition, IPO or venture capital to sustain growth is the main
objective of this research study.
First and foremost on a software start-up company's list of reasons to pursue and engage
in alliances is to leverage the incumbent's tangible and intangible assets. Other factors impacting
their decision to leverage alliances include the opportunity to enhance stability and profitability
and the opportunity to acquire key customers. Another key factor that encourages start-up
company alliance or strategic partnership formation is the need for the start-up company to
establish platform leadership.
Like the pursuit of alliances, foremost on a software start-up company's list of reasons to
pursue and engage in acquisitions is to leverage the incumbent's or the acquirer's tangible and
intangible assets. Other factors impacting their decision to get acquired include the boost such an
acquisition will provide in helping them establish platform leadership. Acquisitions are also
pursued by start-up companies when the founders want to exit. Start-up companies also pursue to
get acquired to survive, when no other option are available. Lastly, they would opt to get acquired
to penetrate new markets.
Given optimal economic conditions, IPOs capture the best liquidity and valuation. It is
advantageous versus getting acquired in that one gets to sustain growth while retaining control of
the software start-up company.
Software start-up companies seek venture capital funding for a number of factors. This
includes getting help in business development, leveraging the VC network, obtaining a
certification effect, diversifying net worth and reducing risk, and pursuing and engaging in
alliances successfully.
There is no one universal paradigm to help a software start-up company determine when
it is best to pursue an alliance, an acquisition, an IPO or venture capital. A myriad of factors
specific to one's situation impacts the decision to choose the right growth strategy. To make the
most informed decision, the executive team must consider all these factors.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Cusumano
Title: Sloan Management Review Professor of Management (Technological Innovation and
Entrepreneurship, T.I.E.)
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When technology leaders on any particular industry space decide on their core
strategies for growth, they usually employ a combination of acquisitions and alliances. These
technology and market leaders usually pursue acquisitions of smaller scale, typically start-up
companies that complement their core products or services, or increase their market share.
Rarely are acquisitions by these leaders purely for financial returns. Acquisitions are usually
pursued to sustain growth by complementing internal research and development and thus attain
long term synergies between the acquiring company and the acquired. Alliances, whether pure
equity investments and/or other strategic agreements between an incumbent and typically a
smaller scale or start-up company, are usually entered into for differing reasons depending on
whether you are the incumbent or the start-up company. Start-up companies usually take
advantage of complementary asset access when striking an alliance with bigger scale technology
and market leader firms. Incumbents on the other hand typically enter into alliances to gain
access to new or breakthrough technologies that complement their core product or service
offerings, and thus increase their value proposition.
Having generally outlined the case for technology leaders or typically bigger scale
firms, let us switch the focus to the side of the typically smaller scale start-up companies. Much
has been written and much research has been conducted focusing on the potential benefits of
pursing alliances and acquisitions to sustain or increase growth on the side of the incumbents.
What this particular research study seeks to address is how such strategies of acquisitions and
alliances can be leveraged by the smaller scale start-up companies. Start up companies will differ
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not just in how such strategies for growth will apply to them, but also what other growth
strategies are available to them. Besides acquisitions and alliances, start-up companies also have
two other main strategies they can employ to sustain and/or increase growth. This involves
pursuing venture capital and/or initial public offerings (IPOs) as well.
In particular, this research undertaking will focus on a specific segment of start-up
companies. Focus, due largely to personal interest of the author, will be on software start-up
companies. Research and analyses will primarily be targeted towards the four main strategies for
sustaining and increasing growth on the side of software start-up companies. This includes
pursuing acquisitions, alliances, IPOs and venture capital. Pursuing acquisitions on the part of
these software start-up companies is defined as the pursuit of acquisition offers from bigger-scale
companies who are technology and/or market leaders in their specific industry space. Alliances,
as defined for this research study, involves at least an equity investment on the part of the
incumbents to these software start-up companies.
Motivation and Objectives
Having spent eight years in the software industry, from the accelerated pace of
growth in the late nineties to the big bust in the years 2001 to 2003 and to its eventual rebound
these days, the author has always been fascinated by strategies that help sustain firms in the
software industry though good times and bad. In particular, interest has always been towards the
sustainability of software start-up enterprises. Given the rapid growth of the number of software
start-up companies alongside the accelerated growth and reach of the internet, stories of
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tremendous success abound as well as accounts of failures. It is within this context that
motivation for this research study was born.
In particular, the primary objective of this research undertaking is to develop an in-
depth understanding of how, when and why software start-ups can best achieve maximum
growth through alliances or acquisitions with the technology leaders of their particular industry.
It also seeks to map out how IPOs and venture capital can be leveraged to attain and sustain
growth on the part of these software start-up companies.
At the conclusion of this research undertaking, it is hoped that a strong framework is
developed for software start-up companies that will aid them in deciding when and why it is in
their best interest to enter into an alliance, pursue to be acquired, pursue an IPO or seek venture
capital, and how they can achieve it.
It is also an objective of this research study to potentially have a positive impact on
software start-up research studies and software start-ups themselves. Personally, the author also
aims to use this research study to aid him in his quest to build and sustain his own successful
software enterprise in the not too distant future.
Research Design and Methodology
Problem Definition
In general, this research study seeks to answer the question: "What are the factors
impacting a software start-up company's decision to pursue an alliance, acquisition, IPO or
venture capital?" Further, it aims to derive in-depth insights as to why these factors are
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important. It will consider, among others, market conditions, technology-life-cycle stage of core
product/service, economic/financial climate and sales growth.
Specifically, it will seek to determine the answers to the following questions:
> Why should software start-up companies take advantage of alliances,
acquisitions, IPOs or venture capital to sustain growth?
> When should software start-up companies take advantage of alliances,
acquisitions, IPOs or venture capital to sustain growth?
>0 How can software start-up companies take advantage of alliances, acquisitions,
IPOs or venture capital to sustain growth?
Definition of Scope
This research study will focus on software start-up companies in the United States of
America. Primarily, it will scope those founded in the Northeast Region given the historically
abundant number of software start-up companies that have been founded in the area and the great
entrepreneurial environment the region fosters. The particular region was also selected because
of its proximity to the researcher's work location, making in-person interviews more feasible for
data collection. No distinction was made in selecting software start-up companies based on
whether they were a product-based, service-based or "hybrid" companies. Likewise, the scope of
this research study does not distinguish between different specific software industry spaces. It
covers a variety of specific software industry spaces including enterprise resource planning
(ERP) solutions, mobile software solutions and applications to more traditional web-based
enterprises. Historically, these companies will have gone through either one or a combination of
alliances, acquisitions, IPOs or venture capital to sustain growth throughout their history.
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Research Design
The primary method of data collection and analysis for this research undertaking will
be the "Case Study Research" method. The primary resource aiding the author on this approach
is the book "Case Study Research: Design and Methods" by Robert K. Yin. To complement data
collection and analyses from the case study research method, secondary sources from an
extensive review of related literature will also be conducted.
Given the form of the research questions focuses on how's and why's, and the fact
that the research does not require the control over behavioral events and the fact that the research
focuses on contemporary events, the case study research method is most appropriate.
This research study's questions appear in Appendix 1. The questionnaire outlined in Appendix 1
was the primary tool and guide used in conducting all the case interviews for this case study
research.
The primary "Unit of Analysis" or basically what the "Case" is for this research study
is the software start-up company that has gone through either one of: alliances, acquisitions,
IPOs or venture capital to sustain growth. If a particular software start-up company happens to
have gone through more than one of these events, which is more often than not the case, each
particular event for that particular software start-up company will be considered one distinct
"case" or "unit of analysis". For each of these "cases", the key decision makers were
interviewed. This included founders, CEOs, presidents and vice presidents, among others.
@ 2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 11 of 155
A review of current and past literature shows that numerous articles and research
studies have been conducted that cover alliances, acquisitions, IPOs and venture capital. Of
particular interest to this research study though are those that could help in shedding light
towards how such alliances, acquisitions, IPOs and venture capital impact smaller-scale start-up
companies. Any such resource that would specifically focus on software start-up companies and
how they could particularly leverage on any of the four strategies would be greatly beneficial.
Having gone through an extensive survey of related literature though, much of the focus has been
towards the bigger scale companies and the venture capital firms themselves. Venture Capital
and Enterprises that are technology and/or market leaders in their respective industry spaces are
predominantly the focal point of much of what has been written and researched.
The various sections that follow reflect findings of different researchers. They are
primarily organized according to the four different strategies for growth. They focus on data and
information that render insights as to how such strategies can be beneficial or disadvantageous to
start-up companies.
Alliances
A study of 696 start-up companies by Professor David H. Hsu of the Wharton School
of Business reveals that start-up companies that are backed by Venture Capital have higher
probabilities of pursuing alliances (Hsu 2006). The extent of venture capital firm backing and
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help is significant for start-up companies to pursue and engage in alliances with the technology
and market leaders of their respective industry spaces. The benefit of engaging in a strategic
partnership for the start-up company is distinctly clear in terms of the access it provides to the
complementary assets of the other partner. Typically, the marketing, sales and distribution
strengths of the larger and more established partner is leveraged by the start-up company.
Although the benefits are clear, such a strategy involves costs and tradeoffs to the start-up
company. In his study, four main costs and challenges are identified that start-up companies
incur when pursuing alliances. This includes:
> Search costs in locating the right strategic partner
> Costs incurred in managing the alliance versus potential partner expropriation
> The opportunity costs of revenue sharing (if any)
> The cost arising from making managers potentially complacent in developing
internal capabilities.
Given these costs, start-up companies typically have greater obstacles in pursuing
alliances in comparison to bigger-scale companies. Search costs are particularly high given the
fact that these start-up companies have yet unknown reputations to potential partners. Unequal
opportunities thus abound for start-up companies when pursuing alliances given this. The
consequences of venture capital help and backing have been found to be significant and
rewarding though. For further discussion on the impact of Venture Capital firms to start-up
companies, specifically towards start-up companies pursuing and engaging in alliances, please
refer to the "Venture Capital" section.
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Besides these challenges that face start-up companies that affect their ability and
motivation to pursue and engage in alliances, there are other factors that either encourage or
discourage alliances. This includes (Hsu, 2004):
> The strength of the start-up company's intellectual property.
> The existence of relationships with intermediaries (e.g. venture capitalists,
lawyers, etc.).
> The necessity of big investments like those for manufacturing and distribution.
The stronger the IP (intellectual property) protection of the start-up company, the
greater the likelihood is of them pursuing and engaging in strategic partnerships. Having a strong
IP protection allows for a lower disclosure and expropriation threat posed when engaging in an
alliance with bigger-scale technology and market leader enterprises. If investment costs are low
and the start-up company has low or no IP protection, the disclosure threat is high. In cases like
these, the start-up company is better off commercializing its core products or services through
competing in the market directly. The greater the IP protection of the start-up company, the
better the threat of expropriation is reduced. For start-up companies, the disclosure risk erodes
their bargaining power. For the bigger companies, the potential "disclosure gain" reduces their
willingness to pay for the benefits of striking strategic alliances with the smaller-scale start-up
companies. As such, the level of IP protection plays a critical factor in either encouraging or
discouraging alliances for start-up companies.
The existence of relationships with intermediaries such as venture capitalists, lawyers
and accountants help start-up companies seek the appropriate partners. Given that they typically
are small and stretched thin, these intermediaries are of much help because of their broad and
extensive knowledge of the key industry players. These intermediaries know who's looking and
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who's trustworthy. Start-up companies who are typically not well suited in finding good strategic
partners will benefit from these intermediaries who often specialize in particular industries and
can vouch for the start-up's core product/service offering and the founders as well.
Hsu, in his study, finds that start-up companies are more likely to cooperate and
engage in alliances if they have to invest huge amounts of capital to compete head-on with
bigger players in the market. In his own words: "As the sunk costs of product-market entry
increase, the gains from trade between start-up innovators and incumbents also increase, so start-
ups will be more likely to forgo competition."
Having discussed some of the challenges and factors that start-up companies face in
engaging in alliances, the next discussion will try to briefly shed light on the side of the
incumbents; the technology and market leaders who actively pursue and engage in alliances with
the smaller start-up companies.
In a study of Corporate Venture Capital firms by Professor Gary Dushnitsky, a link is
established between innovation and alliance engagement by the incumbents (Dushnitsky, 2005).
Corporate venture capital is equity investments in independent start-up companies by incumbent
firms (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2004). Corporate venture capital is the primary means bigger-scale
technology and market leading enterprises pursue and engage in alliances with start-up
companies. They are typically smaller versus the freestanding venture capital firms, but are
essential tools for the incumbents to improve and sustain innovativeness. At its peak in the year
2000, corporate venture capital amounted to $16 billion dollars involving more than 300
corporations.
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Primarily, corporate venture capital is a tool for these incumbents to scan, identify
and leverage and harness on the innovative products and services developed by the smaller-scale
but highly entrepreneurial start-up companies. There are three primary channels through which
the corporate venture capital arms of incumbent firms extract value from start-up companies
(Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2004). First, the due diligence process that an incumbent's venture
capital arm diligently pursues provides them knowledge on entrepreneurial innovations prior to
even investing in such entrepreneurial firms. Second, the incumbent will learn about novel and
breakthrough technologies through the board seats it acquires post investment. Lastly, even if a
start-up company eventually fails, it will shed light on the technical feasibility as well as the
market attractiveness of the technology, a valuable learning experience to the investing
incumbent.
According to Dushnitsky, besides a strong internal research and development (R &
D) and a strong alliance with academic and government research institutions, having an active
corporate venture capital arm allows incumbents to better grow and sustain innovation
(Dushnitsky, 2005). The main focus and objective of such equity investments though are
primarily strategic as opposed to purely financial motives. By creating actual value that is in turn
eventually translated into great financial performance, corporate venture capital fulfills its main
goal (Dushnitsky, 2005). It should be noted though that corporate venture capital and R & D
complement each other versus actually substituting each other and actually competing for
corporate capital budgets. A well developed internal R & D is essential to effectively and
efficiently deriving value for the corporate venture capital investment. Corporations with active
and successful venture capital functions tend to also have strong internal R & D (Dushnitsky,
2005).
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In his study, Dushnitsky claims that there is greater corporate venture capital in
sectors where there is weak IP protection or patent effectiveness. In cases like this, start-up
companies are very secretive and fear piracy. By striking an alliance through corporate venture
capital equity investments, the incumbents are able to possess a mechanism to pierce this veil of
secrecy and are thus able to capture value from the start-up company's innovation.
In general, according to Dushnitsky, such alliances are most probable if the core
products or service offerings of both the start-up company and the incumbent are complementary
rather than being potential substitutes. Corporate venture capital creates firm value for the
incumbent and is widespread especially in the devices and information technology industries. It
is particularly powerful when it is focused on attaining opportunities for breakthrough
technology access versus a return on investment (Dushnitsky, 2005). In his study, he claims that
"Corporations that have stayed the course with venture investing - DuPont, Johnson & Johnson,
IBM and others - tend to make equity investments in innovative start-up companies with
strategic rather than simply financial motives, and in time reap both strategic rather than simply
financial benefits." (Dushnitsky, 2005).
In a study by Professor Edward Roberts and Wenyun Kathy Liu, how technology
leaders decide between pursuing an alliance versus pursuing an acquisition of start-up companies
was mapped out (Roberts and Liu 2001). The core framework that was established by such study
was the mapping out of the different factors that impact the decision to either pursue an
acquisition or an alliance against the Utterback Model of the Technology Life Cycle of the
incumbents' core product. The diagram below illustrates this model.
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RATE Of
INNOVATO
Figure 2.1. The Utterback Model of the Technology Life Cycle
Source: Roberts and Liu 2001, which was Reprinted by permission from the Harvard Business School Press.
From "Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation" by J.M, Utterback, Boston, 1994, p. xvii. Copyright 01994
by the Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, all rights reserved.
A brief overview of the different phases is discussed below. For a more
comprehensive discussion of the phases as well as the framework developed by Roberts and Liu,
please refer to Appendix 2.
Each stage is basically a product of market dynamics and of the character and
frequency of innovations in the products and processes of technology based enterprises.
The Fluid Phase is characterized by uncertainty in products and market. Specifically,
there is a high rate of product innovation in this phase besides a great degree of flexibility in the
processes involved in the manufacture of the product.
The Transitional Phase is characterized by the increase in process innovation,
specifically the processes involved in the production of the technology company's core product.
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It is also at this stage that a "dominant design' appears. The importance of an incumbent's
complementary assets is highly leveraged at this stage as well.
The Mature Phase is primarily characterized by the convergence of product and
process innovations. It is at this stage where there actually is more similarities versus differences
in final products and at the same time there is also a strong pressure on one's profit margin.
The Discontinuities Phase is characterized by the entry of new competition. New
technologies start to enter the market as barriers to entry are increasingly getting low. The
incumbent's assets start to get obsolete and what is now seen here is the actual convergence of
some markets as these new technologies emerge.
The framework developed by Roberts and Liu basically maps out when it is best to
pursue alliances and acquisitions and in what ways, based on where the incumbent's core
product is in the four phases of the technology life cycle. In their study, the following different
activities related to alliances are recommended for each of the different phases:
The Fluid Phase: Formation of alliances to help promote the incumbent's core
product as the industry standard must be heavily invested in. Likewise, licensing strategies must
be propagated to help with this cause. Marketing alliances with key players in the supply chain
must also be actively pursued. Technology alliances must also be established with the more
dominant or established players in the specific industry space.
The Transitional Phase: Assuming the incumbent wins in the battle for the dominant
design, it must aggressively license its core product not just to end customers but to other
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companies that lost in the dominant design battle. It is also at this stage that the formation of
joint R & D efforts with other strategic partners in the market is pursued.
The Mature Phase: Here, the incumbent must pursue partnerships in manufacturing to
guarantee the availability of its core products. Joint R & D ventures must also be sought to share
the risks and costs of innovation.
The Discontinuities Phase: Given that the new entrant here will seek marketing
alliances to gain market recognition and will work towards procuring contracts to supply
technology leaders, the incumbent must actively pursue acquiring the disruptive technology via
outright purchase or strategic licensing agreements.
A discussion on when it is best to pursue acquisitions and in what ways, based on
where the incumbent's core product is in the four phases of the technology life cycle, is
discussed in the next section on acquisitions.
Acquisitions
From 1992 to 2000, $3.5 trillion was spent in acquisitions. The 1990's was
characterized by such a fast rate of innovation that industry leaders given their typically slower
rate of innovation had to keep up by pursuing acquisitions (Chaudhuri 2005).
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A great way of hedging against possibly missing out on a new or breakthrough technology
traditionally has been to pursue acquisition strategies with younger start-up companies with
early-stage technology products in highly emerging markets. The idea likewise has always been
that once the acquirer develops an integration strategy for the companies it has acquired, this
strategy will work effectively in all other acquisitions it makes. In a study by Professor Saikat
Chaudhuri of the Wharton School of Business, the professor argues that the aforementioned
ideas are incorrect (Chaudhuri 2005). In his research study titled "The Innovation-through-
Acquisition Strategy: Why the Pay-off isn't always there", he offers suggestions in which targets
to pursue as well as strategies to use when integrating acquired companies. He argues that while
the challenges of a successful acquisition are significant, those of post-acquisition integration are
equally as challenging and a key determinant of whether pay-offs will be there.
In his study, he identifies four major challenges incumbents face when pursuing
innovation acquisitions. These challenges span across the product, organization and market
levels:
> Integrative complexity due to technical incompatibilities: at the product level,
possibly due to platform disparities.
> Unpredictability of a product's performance trajectory: at the product level,
possibly due to performance/technical uncertainty.
> Integrative complexity due to target company's maturity: at the organization
level, possibly due to company differences in culture, routines and levels of
maturity.
> Unpredictability of the product's market: at the market level, basically about the
product's market uncertainty.
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Addressing these challenges involves detailed planning and piece-meal execution. Of
the four, the unpredictability of a product's performance and market are the bigger challenges.
These factors slow time to market and will lead to diminished financial returns. Existing
acquisition processes, Chaudhuri claims, are more geared towards managing complexity versus
managing uncertainty. Buying companies that have products at the early-stage and are currently
entering uncertain markets is not good. Uncertainty necessitates frequent adjustments which may
be particularly tough during integration. Complexity, unlike uncertainty, is intrinsically
predictable. Here, one can use sufficient resources and project management strategies.
His study therefore recommends delaying acquisitions until such time when
technological and market-related uncertainties have substantially decreased ("wait and see
approach". A key disadvantage here is that you allow for other potential acquirers to tap into the
target company. He also recommends being flexible when pursuing and engaging in acquisitions.
Different company acquisitions require and demand varying approaches. For example, an
acquirer may want to merge operations right away or keep operations separate for the initial
integration period to keep product development uninterrupted for the faster-paced acquired
company. The acquirer must manage the challenges of integration by aligning the levels of
organizational integration, the levels of process adoption and the levels of product knowledge
sharing, with the nature of the complexity and/or uncertainty variables specific to the integration.
Chaudhuri recommends understanding the explicit tradeoffs involved in acquisitions
and the integration efforts that follow, to find the appropriate integration strategy. Some of these
tradeoffs include the following:
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A high degree of integration will enable scale and coordination efficiency BUT
may potentially disrupt routines that underlie the core capabilities and may lower
flexibility.
> An adoption of the target's processes by the acquirer will preserve codified
knowledge BUT may sacrifice scale and replicability.
> Knowledge sharing does expand knowledge wealth BUT may distract resources
from key operations.
Clearly, the motives for acquisitions go beyond financial. The necessity for growth,
consolidation and beating competition are aided by the acquisitions strategy. But when is it really
advantageous to engage in acquisitions? Professor Bruno Cassiman of the IESE Business School
(Instituto de Estudios Superiores de la Empresa, Universidad de Navarra, Barcelona, Spain) in
his research study titled "Will Mergers and Acquisitions be Beneficial or Harmful to
Innovation?" suggests that many companies overestimate the potential of synergies through
acquisitions and underestimate the possible negative impacts of mergers and acquisitions on the
innovation process (Cassiman 2005).
In his study, Cassiman claims that the impact of acquisitions on the innovation
process depend on two factors:
> The technological similarities between both companies.
> The similarities between the markets of both companies.
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With respect to technological similarities, if the focus of both companies is on the
same technology areas, a rationalization of the R & D process is achieved. If the focus is on
complementary products, there will exist a higher possibility of achieving long-term synergies
and economies of scale in their R & D. If both are active in the same or really similar markets,
they both will win market share and achieve economies of scale in both production and
distribution.
The effects of acquisitions to innovation if the merger is between two companies with
similar technologies may include the following:
> Reduced R & D costs and personnel.
> A rationalized R & D due to the possibility of ending some projects as well as restricting
the opening of new research laboratories.
> Faster results from R & D by focusing R & D's mission, prioritizing development over
research and reducing the project times.
> Reduced competition in technology due to the elimination of rival products and the
reduction of the threat of imitation.
On the other hand, if the merger is between two companies with complementary
technologies, the effects of acquisitions to innovation may include the following:
> Develop new competencies in new technology areas
> Gain mass in new areas of technology
> A more focused commitment to the reutilization of technology resources
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If the merger is between two companies with similar markets, the effects of acquisitions
to innovation may include:
> Reductions in R & D operations due to possible closings of some R & D locations and
possible reduction in R & D personnel.
> The possibility of having no new R & D projects.
> Possibly achieving lower returns from R & D due to the probability of developing less
new patents and a slower pace of new product introduction.
Cassiman concludes that once a partner is selected for possible acquisition and merging,
the acquirer must fully understand the impact on R & D to help in its integration efforts and thus
fully capture the value of the acquisition. For mergers between companies with overlapping R &
D operations, the study results show that these typically have a negative impact on R & D.
Having discussed some of the challenges and factors that start-up companies and their
acquirers face in engaging in acquisitions, the next discussion will try to briefly shed light on the
side of the incumbents solely; the technology and market leaders who actively pursue and engage
in acquiring smaller start-up companies.
In a study by Professor Edward Roberts and Wenyun Kathy Liu as mentioned in the
alliances section, how technology leaders decide between pursuing an alliance versus pursuing
an acquisition of start-up companies was mapped out (Roberts and Liu 2001). The core
framework that was established by such study was the mapping out of the different factors that
impact the decision to either pursuing an acquisition or an alliance against the Utterback Model
of the Technology Life Cycle of the incumbent's core product.
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The framework developed by Roberts and Liu basically maps out when it is best to
pursue alliances and acquisitions and in what ways, based on where the incumbent's core
product is in the four phases of the technology life cycle. In their study, the following different
activities related to acquisitions are recommended for each of the different phases:
The Fluid Phase: Here, incumbents must pursue the acquisitions of start-up
companies that strategically complement their core products and/or services. Equity investments
through the incumbents' corporate venture capital arm must actively pursue initial funding to
plant the seed for eventual buy-out in later rounds.
The Transitional Phase: Assuming the incumbent wins the battle for the dominant
design, it should acquire remaining competition.
The Mature Phase: Incumbents in this phase should seek horizontal mergers with
other companies that have complementary products or services. It should also try to divest itself
of non-essential capabilities. It should likewise try to seek and acquire technology start-up
companies that possess products that it would find difficult to develop internally.
The Discontinuities Phase: With the entry of potentially disruptive new competition,
incumbents at this phase should look into possibly providing equity investments to these new
market entrants. It shall likewise seek the acquisition of niche technology start-up companies to
try to move into new markets. It will also do its best to divest itself of investments that do not
align with the current market convergence.
The diagram below (Figure 2.2) best summarizes how technology leaders must use
alliances and acquisitions strategically depending on where their core product is in the
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technology life cycle. Typically, companies are more prone to pursue and engage in alliances as
the technology becomes more defined and as competition heats up. The number of alliances then
dissipates as consolidation decreases the number of companies in the industry. This typically
happens in the discontinuities phase. During the transition phase, acquisitions are usually high.
This is due to the fact that the more established companies will try to will try enhance their
technology portfolios by acquiring more start-up companies. To keep up with competition,
incumbents increase their acquisitions as the dominant design becomes more set and as the
technology matures.
Figure 2.2. Propensity to Ally or Acquire
Source: Roberts and Liu 2001.
@ 2007 Sergio D. Ybanez
Iq AOf
PrQptrWt) TO
LOW
Page 27 of 155
Currently, the trend for start-up companies is going more towards acquisitions versus
IPOs given the faster and better payoffs (Brown 2007). The next section on IPOs will discuss
this in more detail.
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
A start-up company pursues an initial public offering for several reasons. This could
include (Hsu, 2006):
> To raise working capital for business development
> To achieve liquidity for equity holders
> To introduce a currency (publicly traded shares) to do acquisitions
> To spawn further entrepreneurship
In Professor Hsu's study "Venture Capitalists and Cooperation Start-up
Commercialization Strategy", he argues that venture capitalists increase the likelihood of a
successful IPO (Hsu, 2006). A reputable venture capital firm would mean a more reputable IPO
underwriter.
In a study by Professors Giot and Schwienbacher ("IPOs, Trade Sales and Liquidations:
Modeling Venture Capital Exits Using Survival Analysis"), three typical exit choices are
discussed (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2005). The type of exit (IPOs, Acquisitions and
Liquidations) as well as the timing of the exit is studied. Venture capital firms exert heavy
influence on a start-up company's exit strategy. By engaging their portfolio companies in stage
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financing and contractual agreements, they are best able to monitor and control the start-up
company's eventual exit. With stage financing, venture capitalists are best able to deploy
disciplinary action to the start-up company, provide exit options at the different financing rounds
and time their exit appropriately. Contractual arrangements, typically written down in term
sheets, guarantee venture capital firms specific intervention rights, exit options included. These
rights may actually allow the venture capitalist to force an exit and avoid being locked into a
start-up company's equity for a prolonged period of time. This is particularly useful should
disagreements with the founders occur.
In this study, empirical analysis shows that biotech and internet firms have the fastest
IPO-type exits. In terms of liquidation, internet firms are shown to be faster versus biotech firms
which take a while liquidating. In terms of timing, the study shows that as time goes on, venture-
backed start-up companies first exhibit an increased probability of exiting via an IPO. After
reaching a certain plateau however, those that have not yet exited will find it harder to pursue
IPOs. This is most strongly shown with biotech and internet companies. This study therefore
concludes that IPO candidates have a tendency to be chosen relatively quickly. Relative to IPOs,
acquisitions tend to reach their maximum potential further on before starting to decrease.
This study also reveals that geographic locations of start-up companies do not seem to
affect the dynamics of the IPO process. Acquisitions on the other hand are more probable for
start-up companies in Silicon Valley (California) and Route 128 (the Northeast States). Beyond
geographic factors, the study also shows that later-stage or expansion investments have higher
probabilities of exiting through an IPO quickly versus early stage investments.
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Historically, IPOs are deemed to be the most successful and preferred exits for
venture-backed start-up companies. Reputation building though on the part of the venture capital
firm affects the timing of the IPO. Younger venture capital firms may not wait until the market is
prime and ideal. They may need to signal their quality and credibility to potential investors of
follow-on funds as soon as possible and thus opt for an earlier IPO instead.
Venture Capital
Start-up companies these days have more choices than ever with respect to how to
finance their growth. The capital markets of today provide them a variety of attractive options.
Given the low interest rates and strong economic growth the past few years, much liquidity is
available in both the debt and equity markets. In 2005 for example, non-financial corporate
business lending rose to $289 billion compared to $175 billion in 2004 and $85 billion in 2003
(Chung, 2006). Given this and the record breaking amounts venture capital and buyout firms are
able to raise these days, start-up companies are presented with lots of opportunities to access
capital for expansion, provide liquidity for shareholders and founders and/or prepare for a
planned IPO or sale/acquisition.
Debt financing, though less expensive on an absolute basis, is not permanent capital
as it must be repaid over a specific period of time. It is important to note here as well that while
the start-up company incurs the burden of the fixed costs of interest and principal payments, its
shareholders will not give up any significant ownership of equity. Also, in this case, the borrower
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will not take any active role in managing and guiding the start-up company, unless it defaults on
the loan.
Private equity on the other hand is a totally different financial tool, fundamentally
different from debt. This involves the exchange of permanent equity capital for ownership of the
entrepreneurial venture. Typically, private equity firms buy a percentage of the start-up company
and they usually require that they be given board representation and a significant voice in
making strategic decisions. They offer more than financial services. They offer advice,
mentoring as well as the benefits of their expansive network in industry. They likewise help
start-up companies prepare for an eventual IPO or sale. Another benefit of private equity
funding, specifically to the founders of the start-up company, is that it can provide liquidity
which allows the business owners to diversify their net worth and therefore reduce their exposure
to risk (Chung, 2006).
Start-up companies typically require various forms of capital throughout the different
stages of their growth as an enterprise. Initially, they usually use personal assets, credit cards and
bank loans. At a certain point though, the successful and sustaining start-up will need further
capital to sustain and not hinder their growth. It is at this point in time when start-up companies
must decide between debt or equity capital and choose which one is the best option.
In a study of start-up companies by Hsu, Venture Capital firms are shown to improve
the patent productivity and professionalize the human resource practice of start-up companies
(Hsu, 2006). Venture Capitalists are likewise shown to mitigate some of the obstacles start-up
firms may have in pursuing alliances. As discussed in the alliances section prior, start-up
companies face various challenges in pursuing and engaging in alliances. They typically face
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high costs in locating the right partner. Start-up companies also are faced with the threat of
expropriation when engaging in cooperative activity with a strategic partner like the bigger-scale
technology and market leaders of their industry. Start-up companies are also challenged in terms
of how potential partners can evaluate them given their unknown status and/or untested core
product/service offering. Lastly, start-up companies are challenged to pursue and engage in
alliances in general given that they normally are not that developed to engage in such strategic
relationships.
In this study, venture capitalists play an active role in aiding start-up companies to
conquer these challenges. Known for intensive due diligence and monitoring processes besides
their in-depth knowledge of the needs and capabilities of other firms, venture capital firms can
help start-up companies find the right partner through information intermediation. Venture
capitalists can provide privileged information access and thus reduce the search costs for start-up
companies. Given their reputation as trusted intermediaries backed by experience, venture capital
firms can facilitate partnership negotiations for the start-up companies. Also, given their
expansive network, venture capital firms aid start-up companies versus the challenge or fear of
partner expropriation. Partner misbehavior will be dealt with fast and with negative
consequences given a venture capital firm's reach. Endorsements, especially from highly
reputable and successful venture capital firms, also help start-up companies' evaluation by
potential alliance partners. As mentioned, given their unknown reputation and untested products,
start-up companies with reputable venture capital backing are in a way certified to be trustworthy
and credible. Start-up companies, though not that developed to engage in alliances with bigger-
scale companies, can be aided by their venture capital backers given the business development
help venture capital firms offer to their portfolio companies. Venture capital firms typically
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professionalize employment practices and help in forming an excellent board of directors.
Through their vast network, they can also provide contacts for potential suppliers and customers
to the start-up companies.
In general, venture capital firms help start-up companies in three main areas (Hsu,
2006):
> Contribute to structure and governance
> Contribute to business development efforts
> Signaling and certification effects
By using methods such as structured financing and monitoring, venture capital firms
help start-up companies in structuring and governing themselves better. Through mentoring and
being a source of referrals, venture capitalists contribute to business development efforts.
Through association with reputable and highly successful venture capital firms, start-up
companies capture the certification and signaling value it brings and can leverage on this for
building one's credibility in the market.
Besides financial and other benefits, venture capital firms provide guidance and
advice in (Pratch 2005):
> Strategy/product
> Team building
> Customers/partnerships
> Syndication
2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 33 of 155
> Industry analysis
> Exit/Growth strategies
Leslie Pratch, a clinical psychologist who advises private equity investors and venture
capitalists, focuses on analyzing founders being considered for investment. She specializes in
determining if such individual possesses the right personality and psychology strengths to be
successful. In her study "Value-Added Investing: A Framework for Early Stage Venture Capital
Firms", she identifies the framework used by Vesbridge Partners in investing in early stage
technology start-up companies. The framework aids the venture capital firm in how to add value
and reduce risk for both their portfolio companies as well as their limited partners. The
framework is composed of six key areas enumerated in the list above. Appendix 3 shows each of
these in table format and discusses further how venture capital firms can leverage on their
expertise at each investment stage to add value to the start-up company while reducing or
controlling the risks to the limited partners of the fund. The table below (Table 2.2: Six Key
Areas of Value Creation) enumerates the six key areas of value creation a venture capital can
impart on its portfolio of start-up companies. Under each, it further breaks down what specific
elements it can add value in.
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Table 2.1. Six Key Areas of Value Creation
Source: Pratch, 2005.
The certification and value-added benefits of reputable venture capitalists are clearly
what start-up companies seek besides good financial valuation (Hsu 2004). In another study by
Professor Hsu titled "What do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?" the question
on whether there exists a market for affiliation with reputable venture capitalists is posed. The
study also seeks to find out what the costs are for such affiliation on the part of the start-up
companies.
@ 2007 Sergio D. Ybanez
Value Prvpvi
M, andy4010Y
4 -mIt Pah
(Im erilj Team
fkfapmat Rinw
s~~~~~v Casycnaeu ustm
- adidwr AoesimA
Page 35 of 155
In this study, Hsu concludes that his empirical results actually show that start-up
companies are willing to forego offers with higher valuations in order to affiliate with more
reputable venture capital firms. These findings are then actually consistent with the notion that
venture capital firms act more than just being financial institutions. His studies imply that a
venture capitalist's network and certification value may actually be more distinctive than the
money they offer. These "extra-financial" venture capital benefits can therefore have financial
benefits for the venture capital firm in that they can get better prices for the amount of equity
they wish to obtain.
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The table below enumerates the different software start-up companies that were
interviewed for this research study. The check marks on the columns for alliance, acquisition,
IPO and VC indicate for each software start-up company what "cases" were extracted from it.
The absence of a check mark does not indicate that the particular software start-up company did
not go through that activity. It merely means that the particular activity was not the focus of the
cases that were derived from that software start-up company.
Norwalk, CT
Virtual Iron SW Lowell, MA
Black Duck SW Waltham, MA
Winphoria Networks Tewksbury, MA
Vaultus Boston, MA
Pyramid Digital Birmingham, AL
Open Environment Boston, MA
NetNumina Cambridge, MA
Groove Networks Beverly, MA
Table 3.1. List of Cases.
The rest of this section goes thorough the nine different software
the various "cases" that were derived from it.
start-up companies and
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KAYAK-
Person Interviewed Steve Hafner
Title CEO and Co-Founder
Date of Interview April 2, 2007
Year Founded 2004 (January)
Location Norwalk, CT
Initial Source of Funding Founders' Equity Investment
Company Overview
Kayak is a search engine focused on travel services. It helps people search through all
travel service providers (flights, hotels, cars, cruises, etc.) worldwide. Its main value proposition
is the ease and speed of travel planning, a more comprehensive search, and the travel savings it
brings to travel consumers. Kayak is not a travel agency that charges you fees for using its
services. It does not sell airline tickets or hotel rooms or rental car services. It searches and
captures the best deals and brings it to the user for his or her's evaluation. Upon making one's
choice, Kayak redirects you to that specific website for you to make the purchase. Kayak makes
money through online ads and when users choose from any of its searches and redirects you to
that website.
(Source: Kayak's website: www.kayak.com, 2007).
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Company Funding Timeline
Funding Round Series A CVC Series B Series C Series D
Fund Amount $6.8 m $ U $7 m $2.97 m $11.5 m
General Catalyst $6.8 m -- $ U $ U $ 0.5 m
AOL -- $ U $U -- --
Sequoia -- -- $ U $ U $ 0.5 m
Accel Partners -- -- -- $ U $ 10.5 m
* $ U: unknown, data unavailable or held confidential.
* CVC: Corporate Venture Capital.
* Source: VentureSource.com, VenturExpert.com and Person Interviewed.
Venture Capital Activity
VENTURE CAPITAL BACKERS: General Catalyst, Sequoia and Accel Partners
Kayak chose General Catalyst as its first and primary venture capital backer for a number
of strategic reasons. The founders were very familiar with the principals of the venture capital
firm. They also wanted an East Coast based venture capital firm who had great knowledge on
the travel industry. This venture capital firm also must have had investments in the travel
industry. In essence, the founders were looking for a partner that could bring in more than money
to the table. General Catalyst met all these requirements. In particular, it was very strategic in
that AOL's CEO, John Miller, was formerly a partner with General Catalyst. At this time, Kayak
was interested in partnering with AOL. AOL will soon be a strategic partner of Kayak.
Asked to evaluate General Catalyst's help in business development and the structure and
governance of the start-up company, Mr. Hafner says General Catalyst "answered the call in all
fronts".
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Other reasons in choosing General Catalyst for the founders of Kayak included: access to
human capital, the firm's network of top people for potential alliance and business partnerships,
access to great bankers, law firms and accounting companies.
In terms of helping the start-up company through certification and signaling its credibility
for better access to key human resources and business partners, Mr. Hafner says having General
Catalyst as its venture capital backer did not really have a significant impact. Compared to the
certification and signaling effect the credibility of its management team brought, the role of
having General Catalyst as it venture capital backer played a minor one. The Kayak management
team had credibility already given their past success in start-up undertakings prior. Mr. Hafner
for example was with Orbitz before and took it to IPO. CTO and co-founder Paul English has
had several start-ups under his belt already. Essentially, Kayak had a great team already.
Asked on what the key factors were in bringing in Sequoia at the later round of funding
(series B), Mr. Hafner says that at that time Kayak had a website and a proof of concept already.
It likewise had commercialized some parts of it and now it was looking for marketing funds. At
this time, Kayak wanted a West Coast based Venture Capital firm because East and West Coast
Venture Capital firms differ in mentality, networks, and on what they can do for you. Sequoia
also has done past fundings with "search" companies like Google. In fact they are also
represented in the board of Google, and they knew the online search industry very well. Bringing
in Sequoia brought in a whole bunch of networks and contacts that the start-up company didn't
have in the East Coast.
Series C and D brought in another venture capital firm, Accel Partners. At this time,
Kayak now had a great product working in the United States of America. Kayak now wanted to
take the product worldwide. The founders decided to bring in Accel Partners, the London office
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of Accel in particular. They did this because they wanted to expand in Europe and Accel
Partners also was in the mobile platform industry, besides social networking (with
Facebook.com).
In general, Mr. Hafner says that Kayak has been very lucky to get funding from these top
venture capital firms, not anyone can just do that. Kayak and its managing team does due
diligence in seeking the right venture capital firm. Each round they ask themselves what skill sets
do they now require and who can give it best. The also approach only the top people in these
Venture Capital firms so that not much time is spent in securing funding for each round.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the author's
interview with Steve Hafner (Hafner, 2007)).
Alliance Activity
ALLIANCE with AOL (America On-Line, AOL-Time Warner)
The main objective of the alliance was for Kayak to be the technology platform for
AOL's flight search services (essentially like AOL's alliance with Google, with Google
providing AOL its site search technology platform). Although AOL put in equity investment it
was a minor one. The primary rational for this alliance was to have a commercial relationship.
General Catalyst, one of Kayak's venture capital backers, helped in securing this alliance
with AOL. The venture capital firm got them in contact with top AOL executives including John
Miller, the AOL Chief Executive Officer. Mr. Miller was formerly a partner at General Catalyst.
This alliance presented no fear of expropriation for Kayak. In Mr. Hafner's own words:
"Stealth mode companies are weak companies, ... who do no have a strong value proposition".
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"Relying on stealth as a competitive advantage is really weak." Most internet companies
practically have their business models revealed once you go live. "We could have published our
business model and we sill would have outdone everyone else."
Kayak did not have a strong IP base or any IP at all when this alliance was pursued. This
was primarily because their partnership with AOL was based on what the potential of the
company could develop in this category backed by the credibility of the management team to get
things done.
Other AOL complementary assets taken advantage by Kayak included: MapQuest (for
mapping capability), AIM and User Profiles (to pre-populate Kayak profiles). Given AOL's
worldwide reach, these were significant for Kayak. Incorporation of these assets on both sides
were done to make both company's products more meaningful.
This alliance with AOL was also instrumental in helping secure other deals and partners.
Given that AOL signed a multi-year deal with the company with it not having much but a great
vision backed by a credible and top-notch management team, the alliance was to some extent, a
credibility boost for the company. Mr. Hafner views this alliance as an anchor partnership which
helped build credibility to secure clients, partners, and do hiring. He anticipates that this will
decline over time though. Therefore, it is not really such a significant credibility boost given that
historically, AOL has had partnership with other start-ups that have bellied-up in 6 to 12 months.
There are no joint R&D efforts associated with this alliance. Kayak is to be AOL's R&D
function with respect to the flight search space. In Mr. Hafner's own words: "As a young
company, we just move so much faster than their processes, we tend to out-innovate anyone
else."
2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 42 of 155
The alliance does involve revenue-sharing. Kayak has shared revenues with AOL since
day one.
The alliance has been of tremendous help to Kayak in terms of getting its service offering
in front of a lot of users. Over time though, Mr. Hafner does not see it fit to be reliant on
alliances.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with Steve Hafner (Hafner, 2007)).
Steve Hafner's Biography
"Steve Hafner is the Co-Founder and CEO of Kayak.com. In this role, Steve is
responsible for driving company strategy and commercialization efforts. Steve is often seen
studying daily performance reports or giving detailed feedback on evolving product designs. A
seasoned executive, Steve brings extensive knowledge of marketing, e-commerce and online
travel to his position at Kayak.com."
"Steve helped found Orbitz, Inc., the online travel agency site, in November 1999. As a
member of the original start-up team, Steve helped develop and implement the company's
business strategy. During his four-year stint with the company, he was EVP of Consumer Travel,
among other roles, and led the Company's business development, advertising sales, marketing,
and product marketing activities."
"Previously, Steve worked as a strategy consultant at the Boston Consulting Group,
where he managed case teams focusing primarily on healthcare, e-commerce, and industrial
goods. During his time at Boston Consulting Group, Steve was selected for the Ambassador
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Program for BCG's Stockholm, Sweden office and received the Polaris Award for innovation
and outstanding client work."
"Steve began his career at the Marketing Corporation of America, now a unit of
Interpublic Group, where he contributed to strategic planning, target marketing and new product
development for key pharmaceutical and healthcare clients."
"Steve received a B.A. in Economics from Dartmouth College in 1991 and an M.B.A.
from the Kellogg School at Northwestern University in 1997."
(Taken mostly verbatim from Kayak's website: www.kayak.com, 2007).
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Person Interviewed Alex Vasilevsky
Title CTO and Co-Founder
Date of Interview March 22, 2007
Year Founded 2003 (March)
Location Lowell, MA
Initial Source of Funding Staged Series A Funding
Company Overview
Virtual Iron Software is in the business of providing software solutions for creating and
administering virtual infrastructures for the enterprise. Typical customers use Virtual Iron
products for "consolidation, rapid provisioning, business continuity, workload management and
policy-based automation". The solutions reduce the cost and complexity of operating the data
center of one's enterprise.
Virtual Iron takes advantage of "industry standards, open source, and processors with
built-in hardware assisted virtualization" to produce open and economical virtualization options
to the current line of proprietary solutions out in the market.
Although companies have made a lot of investments in their data centers, the underlying
infrastructure remains highly complex, inefficient, and difficult and costly to operate and
enhance. Current server virtualization solutions offer functionalities that answer some of these
needs, but these are mostly limited, proprietary, costly and respond slow to industry trends.
The company's technology uses open standards to increase its customer's choices, reduce
cost and minimize the risk of proprietary lock up.
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(Source: Virtual Iron's website: www.virtualiron.com, 2007).
Company Funding Timeline
Funding Round Series A Series B Series C Series C+
Fund Amount $8 m $12 m $8.5 m $3 m
Highland Capital $4 m $4.24 m $2.41 m --
Matrix Partners $4 m $ U $ U --
Goldman Sachs -- $ U $U --
Intel Capital -- -- $ U --
SAP Ventures - -- - $3 m
* $ U: unknown, data unavailable or held confidential.
* CVC: Corporate Venture Capital.
* Source: VentureSource.com, VenturExpert.com and Person Interviewed.
Venture Capital Activity
VENTURE CAPITAL BACKERS: Highland Capital Partners and Matrix Partners
Virtual Iron chose both Highland Capital Partners and Matrix Partners because it wanted
venture capital that would add the most value besides money. It wanted two investors
specifically because the start-up company did not want one investor to dominate the board and
the company. It wanted two that would provide different opinions at different times, and thus
promote dialogue. In this set-up it will have the ability to reach decisions that are best for the
company.
In choosing the two investors, the start-up company wanted those that also had key
contacts. Bringing the venture capital firm's brand name to the company helped the start-up
company attract employees. It was especially helpful in bringing in the right people for the
board.
@ 2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 46 of 155
In the case of Matrix Partners, the venture capital firm offered phenomenal business
development help to Virtual Iron. It likewise had numerous contacts with different firms and was
tremendously helpful in facilitating partnerships with different OEMS and other strategic
partners in Virtual Iron's area.
Highland Capital Partners provided the start-up company with key contacts. Specifically,
it gave them key CIOs and end users of the product which opened the door for early beta testing
of the product. It also allowed them to engage these early lead users in the definition and
verification of product features.
"The venture capital's brand name brings tremendous value to a small company"
according to Mr. Vasilevsky. It helped certify and signal the start-up company which helped it in
procuring customers, partners and key employees for the founding team. In his own words, Mr.
Vasilevsky narrates how important the certification effect was: "As a start-up with only two
guys, you have no brand name, the initial people you'll be able to hire is the initial people you've
worked with. With the VC network we were able to hire more people." He believes though that
as the company grows, you start recruiting from outside your network and then at this time you
can now advertise having serious capital behind you and that the start-up company has lots of
funding and money allocated to the it. "This goes a tremendously long way in recruiting
employees" since it makes potential employees feel "safer" versus a totally boot-strapped entity,
Mr. Vasilevsky admits.
The start-up company found people through both venues. Top executives to head Virtual
Iron's marketing and engineering for example were sourced through the Venture Capital firms'
network. This network had a tremendous help in building the start-up company through its vast
network of able and worthy pool of professionals.
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"Highland always tells us they don't invest in ideas, they invest in people". "In recruiting
people, we tap in to our own network first, but if that would come out dry, then we would tap in
to the VC network."
The start-up company chose Highland Capital and Matrix Partners primarily because
both were reputable, have been around for a while, and have pretty deep social networks with
knowledge of who would be a good fit to help the company.
For Mr. Vasilevsky, the three main benefits that the Venture Capital firm should bring to
the table are: they should be able to "help recruit, help get key customers and help procure key
partners."
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the author's
interview with Alex Vasilevsky (Vasilevsky, 2007)).
Alliance Activity
ALLIANCE with Goldman Sachs, Intel and SAP
Asked on the reasons behind the switch from having pure venture capital firms to include
corporate venture capital backers, Mr. Vasilevsky explains that the reason is very much
straightforward. "We didn't want anymore pure venture capital as investors after the first two
primarily because there weren't any more board seats available to be given up." After Highland
Capital Partners and Matrix Partners, only pure observer statuses were given to the other
investors of the start-up company.
The alliance with Goldman Sachs was strategic from a customer point of view. They
were a good lead user for the start-up company to test and receive feedback for its beta releases.
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The alliance with Intel was not just an equity investment from the computer processor
manufacturer. Virtual Iron and Intel were strategic partners for Virtual Iron to develop particular
products for Intel. The partnership allowed Virtual Iron access to the newest Intel technology
possible, which it badly needed. In Mr. Vasilevsky's own words, "the only way to get that was
to get money from Intel, there was no other way to get access to the earliest technology that they
have". Virtual Iron wanted access to the newest chips form Intel under the top-secret non-
disclosure agreements that they had. In essence, Intel money was primarily driven by the need to
access their most recent technology.
The alliance with SAP, besides providing for some equity investment, was also strategic
for both Virtual Iron and SAP in trying to figure and map out how virtualization fits in the
marketplace SAP is in. SAP, being a large player in the ERP space/applications, would be
instrumental in this endeavor.
For securing all these alliances, Virtual Iron did not involve any help from its venture
capital backers. These strategic partners, and many more, approached Virtual Iron which was not
looking for money then. Given that the start-up company barely even touched their round B
funds at this time, these alliances were more for strategic reasons than financial.
In its alliance with Intel, Virtual Iron products are very complementary to Intel products.
Specifically, Intel server chips with Virtual Technology with Virtual Iron products allow Intel to
sell more quad-core systems with VT (Virtual Technology).
Joint R & D efforts between Intel and Virtual Iron were done in the open source project,
there was therefore no expropriation fear of Intel on the start-up company. This partnership was a
pure technology exchange in the open source project.
On the strategic partnership with either Intel or SAP, there was no revenue sharing.
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Asked on whether these alliances help establish Virtual Irons core product as the industry
standard and platform leader, Mr. Vasilevsky believes that it has been of significant help.
Especially with the Intel partnership that is pouring in marketing dollars to promote Virtual Iron
technology, the start-up company has a lot of promotions going on with them.
A more long-term goal of these alliances, specifically the one with Intel, is to get help in
establishing Virtual Iron technology as the platform leader. The primary and initial goal
however, Mr. Vasilevsky admits, was really to get access to the incumbent's technology. Help in
product development, marketing efforts, etc. all came in after deriving the primary intent to
partner with Intel.
In describing the main differences between Virtual Iron's strategic alliance with Intel and
SAP, Mr. Vasilevsky explains that while Intel makes platforms that are horizontal (across
various industries), SAP makes very vertically oriented applications. Both are totally different
and bring in different things to the Alliance with Virtual Iron. The core Virtual Iron technology
is designed to get into SMB (Small and Medium Scale Businesses) markets and to very large
environments that can support SAP workloads. Given its alliance with SAP, Virtual Iron now has
access to SAP code to further develop a value offering mutually beneficial to both. Mr.
Vasilevsky cannot divulge further information though on this matter. He cannot talk more about
the alliance details with SAP as they are under a Non-Disclosure Agreement.
The alliance the start-up company is involved in has had a good impact to its
innovation/R & D processes. Mr. Vasilevsky admits that it has helped a great deal given that
instead of guessing what the road map is, they now know what it will be and can now focus on
developing the right features for the up and coming platforms and be ahead of the curve before
the chips come out. If the start-up company did not have access, they would have to wait 6
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months until Intel ships their new products out (they are always 6 months ahead of market). They
then could only start to develop the appropriate features to match the latest processors. Without
the alliance with Intel, the start-up company would really be behind its competitors.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with Alex Vasilevsky (Vasilevsky, 2007)).
Alex Vasilevsky's Biography
"Vasilevsky brings over 20 years of extensive engineering, technology leadership and
management experience to Virtual Iron Software. As a co-founder, Vasilevsky has been
instrumental in defining and creating the technology and architecture behind Virtual Iron. Prior
to Virtual Iron Software, he was Chief Technology Officer at Ucentric Systems (acquired by
Motorola), a leading provider of home media software for media centers."
"An expert in parallel processing, grid run-times systems, and advanced optimizing
compilers, Vasilevsky held senior engineering and management roles in leading technology
companies, such as Avid Technology and Thinking Machines. At Avid Technology he worked
on the award-winning MediaComposer and headed the innovative CamCutter technology. While
at Thinking Machines, a pioneering maker of massively parallel supercomputers, Vasilevsky
created the world's first distributed grid run-time system for the highly acclaimed parallel
supercomputer The Connection Machine, designed a floating point accelerator, and created a
super-optimizing compiler for which he was awarded three US patents."
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"Vasilevsky holds five US patents for his innovative work in parallel processing, he is
listed in The History of the Development of Parallel Computing, and is the winner of three IEEE
Gordon Bell Awards for practical applications of parallel processing research."
"His educational background includes a Bachelor of Science degree in Computer
Engineering from Syracuse University and a Master's degree in Computer Science from Boston
University."
(Taken verbatim from Virtual Iron's website: www.virtualiron.com, 2007).
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blackduckw
Person Interviewed Douglas Levin
Title President, CEO and Founder
Date of Interview March 21, 2007
Year Founded 2002 (December)
Location Waltham, MA
Initial Source of Funding Bootstrapped (Owner's Equity Investment of $750K)
Company Overview
The company provides software compliance management solutions that help companies
manage the creation, management and licensing of software assets. Black Duck was founded in
December, 2002 to address this challenge since current solutions are manual, costly, and error-
prone.
Software design and development has changed over the past few years. The use of third
party and open source components to aid in software development has become routine. But
doing this adds business and licensing issues and risks into the software design and development
process.
Enterprises that develop software must actively manage and control how they create,
manage, and license their software assets by implementing "Software Compliance
Management."
Software Compliance Management is focused on the intellectual property aspect of
software design and development. Software Compliance Management should involve developers
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and lawyers in collaboration to identify software asset issues without negatively impacting
development or hindering its potential. What Black Duck's solutions provide for is having the
capability to proactively and confidently use a combination of internal, third party, and open
source software to build one's applications, without putting one's assets at risk. The company's
solutions also allow one to manage the association of licenses to one's software assets and
addressing one's issues related to licensing and IP.
One of the main value propositions Black Duck offers is providing one the control over
the intellectual property aspects of software. With this, software developers will be able use the
best and most relevant externally sourced software components knowing that they are protected
from the danger of infringing on patents, copyrights, etc. With Black Duck's solution, they need
not worry that they will be forced to publish proprietary software because they did not perform
due diligence prior to incorporating certain software components.
(Source: Black Duck's website: www.blackducksoftware.com, 2007).
Company Funding Timeline
Funding Round Series A Series B Series C
Fund Amount $5.5 m $13 m $12 m
General Catalyst $ U $ U $ U
Flagship Ventures $2.25 m $ U $ U
Red Hat $ U $U -
Fidelity Ventures -- $5.3 m $ U
Intel Capital - $ U $ U
SAP Ventures -- $ U $ U
Focus Ventures -- - $ U
* $ U: unknown, data unavailable or held confidential.
* CVC: Corporate Venture Capital.
* Source: VentureSource.com, VenturExpert.com and Person Interviewed.
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Venture Capital Activity
VENTURE CAPITAL BACKERS: General Catalyst, Flagship Ventures, Fidelity Ventures and
Focus Ventures
The start-up company's founder had three reasons for taking venture capital funding after
more than a year and a half of bootstrapping (i.e., self-funding) operations. First, Black Duck
Software was based on a big idea that needed fuel to launch and succeed. Second, it could not do
it alone. It needed the seal of approval conferred by venture capital in order to sell to the
enterprise. Although it is unusual to bring in a strategic investor in a Series A round, the
company brought in Red Hat as added validity. Third, Black Duck developed and employed a
subscription model that was getting traction when the company was bootstrapping but required
more capital to succeed. Given that this was an expensive way to start the business, it needed
fuel in the tank to grow the business under the chosen business model.
Black Duck had three criteria in choosing the first three venture capital firms (General
Catalyst, Flagship Ventures and Fidelity Ventures). First was personality. The individual VC
mattered because in the end, the founder and company were actually "teaming". Second, Mr.
Levin wanted operationally-oriented venture capitalists on his board. Larry Bohn and Roger
Heinen were just exactly that. Mr. Levin knew Roger Heinen from Microsoft and admired him as
a manager. Also, after Roger left Microsoft, he served on several public company boards. Larry
Bohn had two IPO's in his background and public company experience. Third, these venture
capitalists had a lot of experience investing in I.T. software companies and they had the right
"vintage" to their fund. (Meaning, the funds were early in their investment cycle and had a
longer period left before closing the fund.)
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Besides these three main criteria, Mr. Levin has five other reasons in choosing these
venture capital firms. These were:
> A venture capitalist with a lot of resources: Driven by the fact that pursuing the start-
up company's chosen business model would cost in the neighborhood of $30 million,
he needed venture capital firms that would go the distance.
> A venture capital firm with an entrepreneurial orientation: Mr. Levin wanted a
venture capitalist that would be able to go hand-in-hand with a strategic investor. To
date, Black Duck has four traditional venture capitalists and three strategic investors
or corporate venture capitalists. He believes that it is highly important for all these
seven to be in peaceful co-existence.
> A track record of success in hiring. Mr. Levin finds it important that venture
capitalists be able to help in the hiring process and not just do resume forwarding.
They must offer a really effective and efficient hiring strategy. The venture capital
firms chosen by the start-up company really helped Mr. Levin in sourcing the right
initial team. After a while though, he believes this feature goes a way, sometime
during the Series B phase. It is particularly useful and effective in the Series A phase,
and he believes this is where venture capital help must be leveraged on.
> Business development, reselling, partnering skills. He valued one with a great
network. He wanted all these because he wanted a very active business development
strategy in place.
> Leads and sales opportunities. He admits though that this is very challenging in a new
market and without deep product expertise, VCs are generally not good at this.
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Mr. Levin believes that the reputation and credibility of Black Duck to a large extent is
also derived from the credibility of the individuals - especially executives -- in the company.
In its latest round, Series C, Focus Ventures was brought in to have a California-based
venture capitalist. This was a very strategic decision because Black Duck has a competitor based
in San Francisco, and the only place this competitor has been able to get traction was in Northern
California.
Mr. Levin believes that there are situations where venture capitalists are a really good fit
and there are situations when they are not. He believes that taking in venture capital is a good
idea if you have a really big idea, business model, or operations which need a lot of fuel. When
choosing a venture capitalist, according to Mr. Levin, "you are choosing a partner. You must
choose one with total integrity and one that can focus on your start-up. He or she can't be
splitting his/her time across a very large number of numerous investments." The maximum is
four to five Board seats total for a VC to oversee.
Mr. Levin believes the areas where venture capitalists are not a good fit are the areas
where there aren't any great venture capitalists returns but there still are returns. A good example
for this is the Web 2.0 area where he believes angels can do more good for startups than venture
capitalists.
For him, there are also situations where corporate venture capitalists are more of a fit
versus traditional venture capitalists. Also, bootstrapping is a very viable model if the start-up
company does not need much fuel at the start and can easily generate revenues. For him, venture
capitalists are not a universal paradigm for entrepreneurial ventures and do not guarantee
success.
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(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the author's
interview with Douglas Levin (Levin, 2007)).
Alliance Activity
ALLIANCE with Red Hat, Intel and SAP
The founder, Mr. Levin, had three primary reasons for pursuing and engaging in an
alliance with Red Hat, Intel and SAP. First, these companies were customers before they were
investors. Second, these companies offered a positive industry validation for Black Duck. They
served as an industry "imprintor" -- a mark of approval that signaled to the industry that Black
Duck is the right choice. Third, the networks of these three companies were important and their
corporate venture capital arms were helpful and have an impressive track record.
Asked whether Black Duck products are complementary to the core products of these
three companies, Mr. Levin's answer is both yes and no. Yes: Because they support the open-
source movement. No: Because the investment was also opportunistic on the part of all three
companies. Although it definitely helps, it's not perfectly complementary. Note that SAP has not
been clear on their stance with open-source whereas Red Hat is a full supporter of it.
The alliances that the start-up company is involved in were their own initiative. There
was no help from its venture capital backers in pursuing and securing them. The company's own
initiative, network and strategy were leveraged in securing these corporate venture partnerships.
According to Mr. Levin, "If VCs in general had it their way, there would be no strategic investor
involvement."
2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 58 of 155
Asked whether there ever was a fear of expropriation in engaging in any of these
alliances, Mr. Levin says that there was no expropriation fear that wasn't already addressed and
accounted for in the covenants or agreements for the partnership.
Mr. Levin believes that although these alliances were a help in promoting its core
technology as the platform leader in the industry, the start-up company has basically done this on
its own.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with Douglas Levin (Levin, 2007)).
Douglas Levin's Biography
"Doug Levin founded Black Duck Software in 2002 and has been its Chief Executive
Officer and President since its inception."
"Before Black Duck, Doug served as the CEO of MessageMachines and X-Collaboration
Software Corporation, two VC-backed companies based in Boston. From 1995 to 1999, he
worked as an interim executive or consultant to CMGI Direct, IBM/Lotus Development
Corporation, Oracle Software Corporation, Solbright Software, Mosaic Telecommunications,
Bright Tiger Technologies, Best!Software and several other software companies. From 1987 to
1995, Doug held various senior management positions with Microsoft Corporation including
heading up worldwide licensing for corporate purchases of non-OEM Microsoft software
products."
"Prior to Microsoft, Doug held senior management positions with two startups in
California and served as an IT and financial consultant to an overseas development company."
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"Doug is an adjunct lecturer of Entrepreneurship and Management (on leave-of-absence)
at the Kenan-Flagler Business School at his alma mater, the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. He also holds a certificate in international economics from the College d'Europe in
Bruges, Belgium."
(Taken verbatim from Black Duck's website: www.blackducksoftware.com, 2007).
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winphoria
networks
Person Interviewed Murali Aravamudan
Title CTO and Co-Founder
Date of Interview March 20, 2007
Year Founded 2000 (March)
Location Tewksbury, MA
Initial Source of Funding Series A Funding
Company Overview
Winphoria developed Mobile Switching Centers that were packet-based. These increased
the capacity of wireless voice networks while decreasing operational costs. Their solutions
supported both circuit and packet networks for 2G, 3G, and All-IP wireless platforms. Winphoria
also produced mobile network applications. This included Push-to-Talk for CDMA, GSM,
among others.
Motorola announced last April, 2003 its intent to acquire Winphoria Networks, Inc.
Motorola at that time planned on merging the start-up company into its Global Telecom
Solutions Sector (GTSS) business unit.
The acquisition and merger provided Motorola a better position to deliver on its strategy
to globally provide complete networks to support operators' 2.5 Generation (2.5G) up to 3rd
Generation (3G) systems.
With its acquisition of Winphoria, Motorola sought to augment its strategic position by
incorporating to their portfolio a new telecom switching functionality and thus by providing a
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new competitive media gateway solution. These meant direct benefits for Motorola's carrier
customers who were potentially able to reduce operating costs. Likewise, it offered to these
customers a software-driven switch that was easily upgradeable and could be enhanced
inexpensively.
Mike Cahmpa, then president and CEO of Winphoria Networks, expressed his pleasure
and excitement merging with Motorola. He believed that "the start-up company's cutting-edge
solutions and entrepreneurial spirit will benefit from Motorola's scale and market presence." He
saw the merger as the most ideal venue to bring Winphoria's technology to a more global
marketplace.
(Source: Motorola's website: http://www.motorola.com, 2007).
Company Funding Timeline
Funding Round Series A Series B
Fund Amount $11 m $42 m
Matrix Partners $5 m $ U
North Bridge $3 m $10 m
Norwest $3 m $10 m
Amerindo -- $ U
Banc Boston -- $0.4m
* $ U: unknown, data unavailable or held confidential.
* CVC: Corporate Venture Capital.
* Source: VentureSource.com, VenturExpert.com and Person Interviewed.
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Venture Capital Activity
VENTURE CAPITAL BACKERS: Matrix Partners, North Bridge, Norwest, Amerindo
Debt Financing: Banc of Boston
For Murali Aravamudan, bootstrapping makes sense for start-up companies that are not
capital intensive in starting their idea. This was not Winphoria's case however. To execute its
proposition, millions of dollars were needed. It was not like the typical web 2.0 start-up where
one can self-fund until revenues build up.
The start-up company chose the first three venture capital firms totally based on the
recommendation of personal contacts through their own network.
In the case of Matrix Partners, when Mr. Aravamudan was still working for Lucent, they
dealt with a very good start-up company whose CEO and Chairman were good friends of his.
Later on, when he wanted to leave Lucent and found his own company, he asked these two and
they recommended and introduced him to Matrix Partners.
In the case of Norwest, Mr. Aravamudan knew a partner there who used to work for a
service provider that he dealt with during his days in Lucent.
Geographic location also played a part in selecting these venture capital firms. The
founders wanted them to be New England based since they decided to found the company here
versus California for personal/family reasons.
Strong and credible recommendations from very trustworthy personal contacts that have
gone through the whole entrepreneurial experience with the recommended venture capital firms
played the most significant factor in selecting these venture capital firms. The founders
practically did no big independent research or due diligence.
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According to Mr. Aravamudan, the selected venture capital firms brought in the
"business guys" through their vast network, which was important to the founders who were for
the most part "techies". They tapped into the venture capital firms' network to get executives to
help their start-up company execute its strategies.
Amerindo was primarily brought in because a Series C was anticipated for which
Amerindo would be a critical investor to lead that round. Amerindo specialized in late stage
investments. Typically what happens in start-up company funding to syndicate the amount of the
investment already poured in, a new investor leads further rounds since the initial investors
already have put in a lot and they would want to spread/share the risk. No Series C round of
funding ever took place however as Winphoria was acquired by Motorola leading to the Series C
negotiations.
Banc Boston which later became Fleet and is now Bank of America was purely debt
financing. Mr. Aravamudan admits this was a mistake the founder will not repeat again. This
particular bank had no prior experience in dealing with entrepreneurial ventures. The line of
credit was opened primarily to finance non-core capital expenditures like office furniture, PCs,
servers, etc. which should not be taken from equity money. When the bubble burst in 2001/2002,
the bank immediately got risk-averse and wanted their money back which they had the right to
given their call-back option as specified in the contract. Luckily, the start-up company was able
to pay this off without a problem. Mr. Aravamudan, for future events, would recommend dealing
with Silicon Valley Bank which knows and understands how to deal and do business with start-
up companies.
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In his current start-up company, Veveo, Mr. Aravamudan went with the same venture
capital firms. His choice was based on pure trust built from his prior dealings with these venture
capital firms. He did not even consider any other venture capital firms.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the author's
interview with Murali Aravamudan (Aravamudan, 2007)).
Acquisition Activity
ACQUIRED by Motorola on May, 2003
Winphoria's relationship with Motorola started with its distribution agreements. The
distribution agreement involved guaranteed revenues from Motorola and guaranteed product
performance from Winphoria. When Motorola found out Winphoria was in the process of
pursuing a Series C round, they initially offered to be a strategic investor in that round.
Eventually that interest became the interest to lead that round. This in turn lead to Motorola
eventually deciding to pursue an acquisition of the start-up company instead.
Mr. Aravamudan believes that ""good companies are never sold, they're always bought".
He finds Motorola a natural partner for his start-up company given their past experience working
for them in various engagements already, both locally and internationally.
One advantage of getting acquired according to Mr. Aravamudan is having the capability
to bank on the incumbents complementary assets like its distribution assets. "You suddenly get
so many sales guys selling your product, but you also suddenly lose control as to where you
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exactly want to take you products because now you have make it fit within Motorola's families
of product offerings and align with their sales and corporate strategies."
The biggest challenge experienced during the merger according to Mr. Aravamudan was
the difference in cultures. Although Motorola already has had a long history of acquisitions, this
particular division that acquired the start-up company has had no prior experience yet. The
challenge was basically felt at the mid management level and not at the top level. The top
management understood how important and critical it was to deal and manage the merger very
carefully. But this was not effectively relayed to mid-management. The challenge therefore was
not for the company's founders or top management nor that of Motorola's top management. The
most difficult part was the huge disconnect between the actual people who do the work for the
operations and the engineering side for product development. Motorola employees would strictly
adhere to certain staged corporate processes while Winphoria would go about things as any
entrepreneurially oriented start-up company would do. What would usually take two discussions
in Winphoria would take Motorola two months in protracted discussions to decide on any issue.
There was completely a difference in culture and timelines. Start-ups work on the notion that it
needs to sell something today, incumbents work on a totally different paradigm. In Winphoria,
according to Mr. Aravamudan, there was only one gate, to ship the product as soon as possible.
Paying attention to difference in culture has to be done critically when pursing mergers, admits
Mr. Aravamudan.
The merger also presented the challenge in integrating the start-up company's products to
the incumbent's line of product families as it did not pass the incumbent's strict and multi-staged
processes. This delayed product delivery to customers.
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With the merger, R&D productivity and innovation definitely slowed down, admits Mr.
Aravamudan. He would attribute this not just due to the merger or Motorola's mutli-stage
processes though. According to Mr. Aravamudan , this could also be a factor of Winphoria's fast
growth and its core products maturing already and thus rendering diminishing returns.
Mr. Aravamudan believes that the core team one hires in a start-up is very different from
the next hundred who in turn will be very different from the subsequent hundred employees. The
core team is always highly motivated and dedicated and very smart. In practice, it is hard to
sustain the same level of excellence as a company grows very large.
Looking back, Mr. Aravamudan would still have pursued the acquisition with Motorola
since it did make a lot of sense. For him, it was a life changing event given his passion for
entrepreneurial activities.
In terms of having the acquisition help in setting the start-up company's core technology
as the industry standard, Mr. Aravamudan believes that this did not happen as much as he
expected it to be. What happened was that at this time there was a lot of consolidation occurring
in the specific industry space the start-up company operated in which caused innovation and the
number of new products to go decrease dramatically. Given this growth slump, there was not
much activity in terms of the emergence of a dominant design.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with Murali Aravamudan (Aravamudan, 2007)).
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Murali Aravamudan's Biography
"Mr. Murali currently is the CEO and Founder of Veveo, a start-up company that
develops solutions that enable carriers and service providers to deliver enhanced services and
improve the end-user experience for their customers. Prior to founding Veveo, Aravamudan
founded Winphoria Networks in March 2000. After Winphoria was acquired by Motorola in
May 2003, Aravamudan served as the Vice President and General Manager of the Winphoria
Division of Motorola's Global Telecom Solutions Sector."
"Winphoria was a pioneer of Mobile Wireless SoftSwitch and Instant Communications
applications (Push-To-Talk) for CDMA and GSM networks. Winphoria's technology and
products are commercially deployed in networks across the globe serving several million mobile
wireless subscribers."
"Prior to founding Winphoria, Aravamudan served as Vice President and Chief
Technology Officer of the Communications Software Business at Lucent Technologies.
Aravamudan was a pioneer in the SoftSwitch industry. Prior to the CTO position, Aravamudan
served as a Department Head of Communications Software Research at Bell Laboratories,
Murray Hill."
"Prior to Lucent, Aravamudan founded and served as President of Isochrone Inc., an
Internet Multimedia Software company focused on custom software development and shrink-
wrapped software products. Previous to Isochrone, Aravamudan was the Principal Architect of
AT&T's Internet Enhanced Technology Services."
"Aravamudan has authored 27 US patents, with an additional 20 patent applications
pending in data networking, telephony, database, multimedia and broadband technologies. He
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has also chaired and participated in many key industry conferences such as CTIA,
Networld+Interop, and Voice On The Net. He is based in Andover, MA."
(Taken mostly verbatim from Veveo TV's website: www.veveotv.com, 2007).
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va01ultus.
moblW technologies
Person Interviewed David Birnbach
Title CEO
Date of Interview March 19, 2007
Year Founded 2000 (January)
Location Boston, MA
Initial Source of Funding Series A Fund
Company Overview
Vaultus Mobile Technologies, based in Boston, Massachusetts, provides mobile solutions
that help companies mobilize critical business applications while maintaining tight security.
The start-up company's pre-packaged and custom solutions are designed and developed
around the "Vaultus Mobile Application Platform (VMAP)". The platform offers an ideal
solution for the application mobility needs of various enterprises. It offers comprehensive data
security, as well as enterprise class management, integration and connection functionalities.
Vaultus' main value proposition is empowering the enterprise with the tools for it to take
full management and control of its key mobile initiatives. It allows the entity to modify and
expand these initiatives as its business needs change. It provides for all these while avoiding the
costs and time delays associated with continued professional services agreements.
Vaultus' applications feature a tab based interface that is intuitive and usually requiring
little user training. Its technology allows the user instant availability of corporate mobile
applications and data regardless of network connectivity.
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Vaultus Mobile Technologies is a spin-off company from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT). It developed a standards-based mobile application platform that
simultaneously supported both the BlackBerry and Microsoft-based mobile devices, the first in
the world.
(Source: Vaultus' website: www.vaultus.com, 2007).
Company Funding Timeline
Funding Round Individual Series A Series B Series C Series D
Fund Amount $0.5 m $ 25 m $32.2 m $4.3 m $1 m
Individual Investors $0.5 m $ U -- -- --
@Ventures -- $ U $1m -- --
Investcorp Tech -- $ U $ U $U --
Allen & Company -- $ U -- $U --
Apollo Advisors -- $ U --_--_--
Hikari Tsushin -- $ U -- -- --
Odyssey Investment -- $ U -- -- --
Wachovia Capital -- -- $10 m -- --
212 Ventures -- -- $U -- --
China Development -- -- $ U $ U --
IDG Ventures -- -- $2 m $ U $ U
Research in Motion -- -- $ U -- --
SilverHaze -- -- $ U $U --
Undisclosed Investor -- -- -- -- $ U
* $ U: unknown, data unavailable or held confidential.
* CVC: Corporate Venture Capital.
* Source: VentureSource.com, VenturExpert.com and Person Interviewed.
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Alliance Activity
ALLIANCE with RIM (Research in Motion)
This strategic partnership is more than an equity investment. Vaultus works closely with
RIM because most of its customers have shifted to the Blackberry platform of RIM, from the
Windows mobile platform, and this is where most of its revenues come in now.
This strategic partnership is mostly on the R&D side. RIM helps Vaultus by keeping
them well informed as to where RIM is headed in terms of new devices and technologies.
Vaultus becomes the alpha testers of most of their new products. Vaultus typically gets access
six months in advance of any new RIM product launch.
According to Mr. Birnbach: "Our strategy has been to align with big distributors of
complementary products in the wireless mobile industry. Half of our leads come from the device
manufacturers."
The decision to ally with RIM was predominantly pursued because it was primarily
where the market demand was coming from. Most of Vaultus' key customers like the big
corporate giants such as Merrill Lynch and Procter and Gamble all went with RIM. Vaultus
aligned with where the market was going. RIM particularly focused on the security aspect of
moving data versus Microsoft which focused on other aspects. Also, RIM was the only one to
pass the test of most corporations.
This alliance was pursued by both parties. RIM needed Vaultus to produce more
applications to enhance the value proposition of its mobile devices and Vaultus needed RIM to
sell more mobile devices for it to get more traction in its various mobile application products.
For RIM to sell more mobile devices, it has to transcend its current status as being just an e-mail
device. In an initiative commonly know in the mobile industry as "Beyond Email", mobile
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device manufacturers are increasing the demand for its devices my promoting more uses for it in
terms of having more core enterprise applications for it, beyond email. Hence the alliance
between both companies is very significant and strategic.
Since RIM does not sell its mobile devices directly to end users but through service
providers, Vaultus allies with these companies as well to leverage on their distribution and
marketing initiatives. The start-up company engages in joint trade shows and other marketing
initiatives with these service providers.
Vaultus also has alliances with Palm, Motorola, Samsung and Nokia. Only RIM has an
equity investment in Vaultus. This equity investment is a minor one and RIM is not a majority
owner of the start-up company.
According to Mr. Bimbach, RIM is its the closest partner because that's just where most
of the demand for mobile devices is coming from. "Take the financial companies for example
who today purchase 600 to 700 RIM devices a month. Most wireless carriers/service providers
sell 25 Blackberries for every 3 Windows mobile devices."
Asked on whether the alliance with RIM has made it difficult for Vaultus to pursue other
alliances with other players in the mobile devices industry, Mr. Bimbach says: "We originally
thought so, but in fact it has worked for us". Given the fact that Vaultus mobile applications have
driven sales growth for RIM, other manufacturers like Palm are now more interested to partner
with Vaultus.
Vaultus sells both to mobile device manufacturers as well as end corporate users, mostly
financial and retail industries. It also licenses its technology to other software firms. It has two
revenue models. It sells direct and at the same time licenses its technology to other top software
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makers for mobile applications. For example, Cognos licenses from Vaultus for its business
intelligence software.
The aim of licensing is to help Vaultus establish platform leadership in this industry; help
it become the dominant design. They now license their technology for other mobile software
manufacturers to build their own custom applications. They prefer this so they do not have to
build from scratch and it enables them to get to market faster.
Vaultus aims to be the primary mobile platform as the industry unfolds. Through careful
and strategic alliances and licensing deals, it aims to be the dominant mobile platform in the
industry. It focuses its efforts in three areas to achieve this:
> Sell direct to end/corporate users.
> Licensing/OEM Vaultus Technology to other Mobile Software applications
providers.
> Have two large carriers directly sell Vaultus applications to end/corporate users in
a subscription model.
The alliance with RIM gave Vaultus credibility, admits Mr. Birnbach. "Alliances are very
important for software start-up companies, the earlier, the better, because these take time to
pursue and eventually establish." It is tough to build, but once built, it is withstanding. The
incumbent will not just forsake you because it also took them time and much effort to establish
the alliance. "Signing the contract is one thing, but one must actively cultivate the relationship"
adds Mr. Birnbach.
Although RIM is Vaultus' primary strategic partner, other strategic investors like Allen
and Company are highly important for the start-up company as well. Allen and Company is
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Rupert Murdoch's Investment arm. Rupert Murdoch owns News Corporation (Fox, Myspace,
etc.), the largest media company in the world. This strategic alliance gives Vaultus the advantage
of getting valuable and timely information from Allen and Company and its vast network.
Through this relationship, Vaultus is able to derive various perspectives on media trends,
information and advice on the convergence of media and telecommunications. Allen and
Company has the relationships in the media ecosystems that add value and more network to
Vaultus.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with David Birnbach (Birnbach, 2007)).
David Birnbach's Biography
"Mr. Birnbach has worked in the software industry for 25 years, and has extensive
experience in both software development as well as sales and marketing. Prior to joining
Vaultus, he served as an executive with Marketsoft, where he led the sales organizations in the
U.S. and abroad. He has also held management and executive positions with Onyx Software and
Digital Equipment Corporation. A strong advocate for education, Mr. Birnbach has been a
member of the Andover School Board in Andover, Massachusetts, and also a member of MIT
Sloan School of Management's executive education assessment committee."
"Mr. Bimbach holds a B.S. in Mathematics from the University of Arizona, and an M.S.
in Management of Technology from MIT's Sloan School of Management."
(Taken verbatim from Vaultus' website: www.vaultus.com, 2007).
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Person Interviewed Dharmesh Shah
Title CEO and Co-Founder
Date of Interview March 15, 2007
Year Founded 1994 (April)
Location Birmingham, AL
Initial Source of Funding Bootstrapped (Owners' Equity Investment)
Company Overview
Pyramid Digital Solutions was founded in 1994. It was a privately held company that
provided software solutions aimed at serving the retirement plan industry with its suite of
servicing and automation applications. Pyramid Digital Solutions was the leading provider of
web-based and back-office automation software applications for retirement plans. It was a three-
time member of the Inc. 500.
Its web-based application offered a continuously growing set of features with a high level
of customization capabilities. The company employed advanced architecture that provided for
easy integration, flexible configuration, and faster time to market.
Pyramid's clients took advantage of the company's solutions that utilized a single set of
business rules across all its applications. This ensured consistency and accuracy across all service
areas.
Pyramid Digital Solution strategically allied itself with some of the nation's top record
keepers. It served and partnered with this active community and kept its value proposition
constantly in check.
@ 2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 76 of 155
Last August 16, 2005, SunGard announced its acquisition of the software company. The
acquisition included the company's full suite of retirement industry solutions. This included:
PlanHR, PlanOffice, PlanRep, PlanTransmit, PlanVoice, PlanWeb, PyramidLink and
PyramidReports.
Combined with SunGard's existing web products (OmniOnline and OmniManager), the
Pyramid acquisition helped ensure that SunGard's clients received a comprehensive suite of
web-based retirement plan administration. The acquisition was expected to be seamless in terms
of product integration and client service given that all customers will continue their existing
relationships with their current contacts.
After the acquisition and eventual merger, Pyramid Digital Solutions discontinued its
products and services in the retirement plan services industry. It continued to operate under the
name IngeniSoft, LLC (www.ingenisoft.com).
(Source: Pyramid's website: www.pyramidonline.com, 2007).
Company Funding Timeline
The start-up company's initial source of funding was the founders' own equity
investment. Bootstrapping itself until it was self-funded and sustaining, Pyramid Digital
Solutions grew to be a dominant software maker up to it's acquisition in 2005 by SunGard. The
start-up company did not take on any external investments. No venture capital was involved
throughout its entire history of operations.
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Acquisition Activity
ACQUIRED BY SunGard on August 16, 2005
Both founders of Pyramid Digital Solutions were former employees of SunGard. The
main thrust they had when founding the company was to build products for that same community
of customers. There was no overlap though in products, SunGard was even reselling their
products and getting commission.
In 2000, the start-up company got to a point where the average revenue per customer was
now greater than what SunGard made. At this time, SunGard offered to acquire the company.
However, the valuation was not good for the founders. The start-up company at this time had
triple digit growth and had a very high potential for further growth.
Two years hence, both parties revisited the issue. For the founders, being acquired still
made sense. Given that growth had tapered a little bit now, it even made more sense. The start-up
company was stabilizing at this time but valuation was still not optimal and both parties could
not agree on the appropriate valuation.
Finally in 2005, the founders sold Pyramid Digital Solutions. They did so for two primary
reasons:
> Growth had leveled off for the start-up company. The founders did not see much
of an upside anymore as they were saturating their market already. They saw the
upper limit of what Pyramid could become.
> Personally for Mr. Shah, he wasn't as interested in the business anymore. He
already was starting to get his hands off by putting in place a management team to
run Pyramid. "It was a great experience, I learned a lot, but it was time to move
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on" according to Mr. Shah. At this time also, he was now pursuing graduate
studies at MIT and it felt the timing was now right, and both parties already
agreed on the valuation. The founders finally confirmed the sale knowing that
their customers and employees will be taken cared of. Also, with the company
moving towards a more services based revenues versus products based, Mr. Shah
did not find it as interesting anymore.
The thought of an IPO was considered but at this time the IPO market had shrunk
considerably for software companies. Besides, the founders didn't think they could have pulled
an IPO off. Headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama, with limited access to the financial industry
and no significant network with the investment banking community, Mr. Shah did not think
Pyramid had the right profile that the public market would accept. It was so "nichey" and the
public markets would not be receptive.
At the time of the acquisition, the company's products were already mature with a steady
customer base. It was now seeing the shift from being a products company to a services
company. More and more revenues were now coming from services.
The impact of the lack of Venture Capital involvement was both good and bad according
to Mr. Shah.
It was good because the acquisition would not have happened because a venture capital
firm would have wanted a higher price. Although having a venture capital involved would have
been good for Pyramid given that they would have pushed them to achieve more and deliver its
ultimate potential, the founders were not really convinced that they needed venture capital
funding. Likewise, the founders did not believe that they could have achieved a higher valuation
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to compensate the venture capital firms that could have been involved because the market that
they were in would only have led to an opportunity for a modest exit.
It was bad because in the end, the company lacked the network of potential follow on
funding, it did not maximize the acquisition value and it did not have the expertise nor the
savviness a venture capitalist would have brought in.
The challenges Pyramid and SunGard experienced when integrating were minimal.
SunGard has done many acquisitions in the past and is experienced in acquiring and integrating
other companies. Logistics worked well and integration went smoothly with SunGard's strategy
of leaving the company alone for the first year or two. It left Pyramid in the same location and let
it operate independently. It had the same mid-management team. Only the very top executives,
the founders specifically, were transitioned to SunGard as part of the deal. Other than this, not a
whole lot changed. There were no lay-offs.
Product integration went smooth since both companies were basically selling to the same
customers and SunGard support was already integrated into Pyramid's products. Pyramid was
already consuming SunGard's APIs. Pyramid was the front end and SunGard was the back end.
Product integration was not difficult then. Both served the same customers and had the same
underlying technology infrastructures.
Although market size did not grow with the merger, it brought in more revenues from the
same market. There was little overlap; for the most part both companies' products were
complementary. Since Pyramid products had a stronger brand and market presence, most of
Pyramid's products that overlapped with SunGard's were kept as is after the merger.
The effect on innovation and R & D had innovation basically stall. This did not surprise
anyone though. Neither SunGard nor the founders were surprised because essentially what
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SunGard is good at is extracting value from pre-existing innovations. They were just up for the
opportunity to maximize the cash from existing products and customer base. The founders did
not expect SunGard to put in more money to invest in R&D and build new products to increase
market size.
The merger's help in establishing market and platform leadership for Pyramid was
significant. It allowed Pyramid to go after really big corporate customers given the SunGard
brand name, size and stability. This was something Pyramid would not have accomplished given
its size and not to extensive history relative to SunGard's.
Looking back, Mr. Shah would still have done the acquisition but would have sought for
a better acquisition price. Having gone through Sloan and experience the Boston Area start-up
community, Mr. Shah believed he would have benefited if he knew how to do valuation better
then. He believes he could have gotten more terminal value if he was more sophisticated about
the way he thought about valuation.
A last advice from Mr. Shah when going through an acquisition is how a start-up
company must not change how it operates or invests in R&D just because it is expecting to be
bought up anyway. It should continue to operate and compete as if the acquisition offer is not
there. Doing otherwise would weaken the company's position and may end up short changing
the entity. Anything can happen during the acquirer's due diligence efforts. It is not worth the
risk to having your behavioral patterns change. It will be psychologically difficult to do, but it is
what you should do.
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(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with Dharmesh Shah (Shah, 2007)).
Dharmesh Shah's Biography
"Prior to his current software venture (HubSpot.com), Dharmesh Shah was founder and
CEO of Pyramid Digital Solutions, an enterprise software company selling to large financial
services companies. Pyramid was a three time winner of the Inc. 500 award and an industry
leader in providing innovative web applications available to millions of consumers. The
company was acquired by SunGard in 2005."
"In 2005, Dharmesh started "OnStartups.com", an online community for entrepreneurs
that is now in the top 10 most read blogs on the topic of startups receiving over a thousand
visitors a day."
"Dharmesh has a B.S. in Computer Science from the University of Alabama and an M.S.
in the Management of Technology from MIT."
(Taken mostly verbatim from Hubspot's website: www.hubspot.com, 2007).
@ 2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 82 of 155
OEC
Person Interviewed Imran Sayeed
Title Co-Founder
Date of Interview March 9, 2007
Year Founded 1992 (September)
Location Boston, MA
Initial Source of Funding Part of an Incubator
Company Overview
The Open Environment Corporation, based in Boston, MA, was a leading provider of
multi-tier client/server software products that were highly scalable. These were used by hundreds
of Global 1000 corporations.
Open Environment was founded in 1993 and pioneered the three-tier client/server
architectures. Since then, this architecture grew to become a de facto development standard for
developing scalable enterprise software applications. The software company's product line
included "Entera" ("an independent framework for building, managing and deploying highly
scalable, client/server applications"), and "OLEnterprise" ( "the industry's first open, distributed
object environment based on Microsoft's OLE").
On May 13, 1996, Borland International Inc. announced its acquisition of the Open
Environment Corporation.
According to Gary Wetsel, then President and CEO of Borland International at the time
of the acquisition, the acquisition of the Open Environment Corporation was an important part of
their strategic plan and was aimed at accelerating Borland's growth in the client/server and
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Internet markets. With this acquisition, Borland hoped to strengthen its opportunities to serve
departmental client/server developers and extend its solutions for the enterprise. The acquisition
of Open Environment more than doubled Borland's worldwide client/server sales force and gave
it important new client/server and Intranet support, consulting capabilities, among others.
(Source: Securities and Exchange Commission's website: www.secinfo.com, 2007).
Company Funding Timeline
Funding Round Series A IPO Ac uisition
Fund Amount $6 m $41.3 m $65 m
Appleby $ U --
Frontenac $ U -- --
Hancock Venture $ U -- --
Borland -- - $65 m
* $ U: unknown, data unavailable or held confidential.
* CVC: Corporate Venture Capital.
* Source: VentureSource.com, VenturExpert.com and Person Interviewed.
IPO Activity
The company completed a $41.4 million IPO on April 13, 1995
Along with the founders, the start-up company's venture capital backers also wanted to
pursue the IPO. Both had a voice in the choice of the underwriter. The reputation of OEC's
venture capitalists did not matter in securing a good IPO underwriter. The founders were serial
entrepreneurs with good credibility already.
Typically, the best outcome in terms of liquidity and valuation for a start-up company
and its founders is an IPO exit, especially if you want to scale the company and retain control of
its direction.
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According to Mr. Sayeed, timing is critical. The timing of this IPO could have been
better. The company just got a new CEO from CompUSA and it missed it first quarter earnings
target at the time of the IPO. "We should have timed our IPO with good revenue generation
because once earnings projections were missed, as a public company, we got hit hard by the
market. The IPO itself went well but the stock price took a hit once the earnings were missed."
Acquisition Activity
ACQUIRED BY Borland on May 13, 1996
This merger was pursued by both sides. OEC wanted to be acquired because its revenues
at that time were getting shaky and Borland wanted to acquire OEC because it wanted the start-
up company's technology which it was really interested in.
OEC pursued to be acquired for both financial and product strategy reasons, its
products were highly complementary to Borland's and its earnings were becoming unstable.
Looking back, Mr. Sayeed would not have pursued the merger because a year into it,
the management team from Borland that pursued the acquisition resigned and the new
management team did not really understand the value OEC's acquisition brought to Borland.
There was difficulty in integration between the two companies because both served
different markets and both had different products (though complementary). Borland was
primarily a desktop company that primarily marketed to developers whereas OEC was an
enterprise company that marketed to large corporations. Both had very different markets, very
different product lines, very different sales cycle and price points, and very different sales
channels. Borland's typical product would average $4,000 and was sold through various
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distribution channels. OEC sold direct to large enterprises at an average price of half a million
dollars. One catered to a lot of customers versus the other that catered to fewer but bigger
customers.
Integration challenges at the organization level were not more difficult or easier than
most typical mergers between software start-up companies and incumbents, according to Mr.
Sayeed.
Innovation and R&D productivity was negatively impacted by the merger though. Most
of the OEC key people (architects and founders) left after the merger.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with Imran Sayeed (Sayeed, 2007)).
Imran Sayeed's Biography
"Imran Sayeed has led netNumina, before it got acquired by Keane, from a 15 person
startup to a leading technology strategy and consulting firm named one of Computerwold's Top
100 emerging companies of 2000. Under his leadership, netNumina has won more than 30 of the
leading financial services & pharmaceutical institutions in the world as clients, raised more than
$25MM from leading venture capitalists and strategic investors and received more than 20
industry awards for its work. Recently, netNumina was named to Inc 500's list of fastest growing
private companies in the US."
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"Sayeed has over thirteen years of experience in software and services. Previously, as a
founder of Open Environment, Sayeed helped pioneer multi-tier client server technology, and
grew the company from a 10-person startup to an IPO and leadership in the middleware market."
"Sayeed has written and spoken extensively in leading industry conferences and trade
journals over the last 10 years on entrepreneurship, e-business and technology. Sayeed serves on
the Advisory Board of several public and private software and wireless companies. Sayeed also
holds a patent on technology for providing secure financials transactions over the Internet that he
jointly developed with Citigroup. He is also the President of the Boston chapter of the
Organization of Pakistani Entrepreneurs of North America (OPEN) and a director of OPEN
National."
"Sayeed attended Brown University where he majored in Engineering, and Harvard
University, where he did post-graduate work in business, marketing and product development."
(Taken mostly verbatim from the MIT Entrepreneurship Center's website: www.
entrepreneurship.mit.edu, 2007).
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Numina.
Person Interviewed Imran Sayeed
Title Founder and Chairman
Date of Interview March 9, 2007
Year Founded 1997 (April)
Location Cambridge, MA
Initial Source of Funding $1.5 million in Guaranteed Revenues from Borland
Company Overview
NetNumina was a software services company that focused on solving complex business
problems and helping organizations achieve their goals by leveraging technology. It was founded
in April of 1997. Since then, NetNumina has provided technology strategy, architecture and
design services, and custom application development services to some of the largest and most
reputable business enterprises. Some of its clients included leaders in the financial services,
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and other industries who have grown to rely on the company's
service offerings to help keep them highly competitive and successful. NetNumina maintained
competitive advantage by embracing their challenges with "strategic thinking, sophisticated
technical knowledge, and creative problem solving expertise."
The software start-up company was acquired by Keane on February of 2005 for an
undisclosed amount.
(Source: NetNumina's website: www.netnumina.com, 2007).
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Company Funding Timeline
Funding Round Series A CVC Acquisition
Fund Amount $21 m $4 m $ U
Banc Boston Ventures $ U -- --
Greylock Partners $ 8.46 m -- --
TA Associates $ 10 m -- --
Allaire -- $ U -
BAE Systems -- $ U --
Individual Investors -- $ U --
Keane -- -- $ U
* $ U: unknown, data unavailable or held confidential.
* CVC: Corporate Venture Capital.
* Source: VentureSource.com, VenturExpert.com and Person Interviewed.
Venture Capital Activity
VENTURE CAPITAL BACKERS: Banc Boston, Greylock, TA Associates
About three years into the start-up company's life, there was not enough revenues to
support an IPO and the company was growing fast and needed fuel, so it pursued venture capital.
Given that an IPO down the road was what the start-up company wanted to pursue, it did
not make sense at this time to be acquired or sell the company. Thus, venture capital money was
the appropriate mechanism to fund the growth of the company.
The founders chose the venture capital firm with the best reputation in the market and
had a track record of understanding their particular industry space and how to make the start-up
company grow. The round was actually oversubscribed and the founders chose the two that were
the best.
At this time, the start-up company also had an acquisition offer from BAE Systems. It
rejected the BAE acquisition offer primarily because of the objective of pursuing an IPO later on.
In hindsight, Mr. Sayeed says they should have taken the acquisition offer by BAE in
2000 for $50 million because the market soon slowed down significantly after that.
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Alliance Activity
ALLIANCE with BAE Systems, Allaire Corporation
BAE Systems put in $1.5 million in equity investment. Since NetNumina did not want to
be acquired, BEA opted to be a strategic investor of the start-up company.
Since NetNumina was already doing a lot of work with a lot of BAE products, the
strategic investment or partnership guaranteed the continuation of this product development
partnership.
Acquisition Activity
ACQUIRED BY Keane on February 28, 2005
NetNumina opted to be acquired versus an IPO because although it was a profitable
company, the IPO market for a software services company at this time was really difficult. To
have a liquidity event prime for an exit, NetNumina would have to wait another ten years or so
and grow its revenues to support an IPO. Also, NetNumina wanted to be acquired by a bigger
company with an off-shore development arm that would complement its high-end on-shore
development capabilities. Keane fit that well. They badly wanted NetNumina's technology
strategy capabilities as well as its architectures.
Mr. Sayeed says that the acquisition price was fair to what and how the market was at this
time.
The challenges in integration primarily were due to both coming from very different
backgrounds. NetNumina was a high-end software strategy and services company versus Keane
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which was big in mass outsourcing. Both had very different operational and business models,
and a different client base. But so far though, the integration has gone fairly well.
Integrating both at the organization level was also a challenge for both. NetNumina was a
significantly smaller company. The challenge was how to integrate 100 people to Keane's
10,000+ plus organization. Do you distribute them and eventually have them get lost in the
organization or do you keep them in one group and risk less exposure and knowledge sharing.
This is still a work in progress and is definitely one of the core challenges in the merger right
now.
Currently, acquisitions are the best modes of exist versus an IPO where the bars remain
very high in terms of the required revenues one must achieve, according to Mr. Sayeed. Besides,
there is a lot more overhead involved in being a public company.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with Imran Sayeed (Sayeed, 2007)).
Imran Sayeed's Biography
"Imran Sayeed has led netNumina, before it got acquired by Keane, from a 15 person
startup to a leading technology strategy and consulting firm named one of Computerwold's Top
100 emerging companies of 2000. Under his leadership, netNumina has won more than 30 of the
leading financial services & pharmaceutical institutions in the world as clients, raised more than
$25MM from leading venture capitalists and strategic investors and received more than 20
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industry awards for its work. Recently, netNumina was named to Inc 500's list of fastest growing
private companies in the US."
"Sayeed has over thirteen years of experience in software and services. Previously, as a
founder of Open Environment, Sayeed helped pioneer multi-tier client server technology, and
grew the company from a 10-person startup to an IPO and leadership in the middleware market."
"Sayeed has written and spoken extensively in leading industry conferences and trade
journals over the last 10 years on entrepreneurship, e-business and technology. Sayeed serves on
the Advisory Board of several public and private software and wireless companies. Sayeed also
holds a patent on technology for providing secure financials transactions over the Internet that he
jointly developed with Citigroup. He is also the President of the Boston chapter of the
Organization of Pakistani Entrepreneurs of North America (OPEN) and a director of OPEN
National."
"Sayeed attended Brown University where he majored in Engineering, and Harvard
University, where he did post-graduate work in business, marketing and product development."
(Taken mostly verbatim from the MIT Entrepreneurship Center's website: www.
entrepreneurship.mit.edu, 2007).
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grooveNETWORKS
Person Interviewed Brian Halligan
Title Vice President of Sales
Date of Interview February 28, 2007
Year Founded 1997 (October)
Location Beverly, MA
Initial Source of Funding Bootstrapped (Founder's Equity Investment)
Company Overview
Groove Networks was a provider of collaboration software specifically for ad-hoc
workgroups. Microsoft Corporation acquired Groove Networks in April of 2005 and the
company is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Microsoft. Groove's products and its entire
organization are now part of Microsoft's Information Worker Business Unit.
With the acquisition of the software start-up company in April of 2005, Microsoft said it
initially planned to continue selling current and future Groove products on a standalone basis.
Meanwhile, it said, it was likewise exploring other ways to take advantage of Groove's
technologies.
Ray Ozzie, the founder of Groove Networks, is now one of three chief technology
officers at Microsoft. He now reports directly to Microsoft Chairman and Chief Software
Architect Bill Gates. Ray Ozzie founded Groove Networks in October ofl 997. The start-up
company shipped its first beta version of Groove in October of 2000. It brought its first
commercially available version of the product to market in April of 2001.
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Groove Networks continues to sell its products and services through a direct sales force.
It still maintains offices throughout the United States. It also deals with value-added resellers
(VARS) in Europe, Japan and elsewhere. It also has a workgroup sales team operating from the
company's offices in Beverly, Massachusetts.
(Source: Groove Networks' website: www.groove.net, 2007).
Company Funding Timeline
Fund Amount $5.2 m $10 m $41 m $54.3 m
3eries E
$38 mLT-I -l 0M -
Accel Partners $5 m $3.18 m $21.86 $1.66 m $1.08 m
Individual Investors $0.2 m $ U $ U $ U $ U
Intel Capital -- -- $12.5 m -- $10 m
Microsoft -- -- -- $51 m $25 m
* $ U: unknown, data unavailable or held confidential.
* CVC: Corporate Venture Capital.
* Source: VentureSource.com, VenturExpert.com and Person Interviewed.
Venture Capital Activity
VENTURE CAPITAL BACKER: Accel Partners
Accel Partners was primarily chosen because founder Ray Ozzie knew one of the
resident-entrepreneurs there who worked at Lotus before with him. This led to the introduction to
Jim Breyer, a partner at Accel.
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(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the
author's interview with Brian Halligan (Halligan, 2007)).
Alliance Activity
ALLIANCE with Microsoft and Intel
It would have been great if Groove was able to grow itself and it would have been better
off building its own platform and not done an alliance with Microsoft. But the reality was, what
Groove built was interesting to the industry but there wasn't enough uptake that it could be this
self-sustaining and independent platform without an alliance with Microsoft, admits Mr.
Halligan.
"So we tied with Microsoft and leverage on their very huge sales force, very big reach,
and get leverage through them." The choice was Microsoft, IBM or Open Source. Given the
history between Ray Ozzie and Bill Gates then of IBM eventually buying Mr. Ozzie's Lotus
notes and it becoming a direct competitor to Microsoft Outlook and Exchange products, Mr.
Ozzie consulted Mr. Gates this time from the very first day that Groove was founded. Microsoft
then really regretted and saw it as a big mistake on their part not to have ended with the
acquisition of Lotus.
The alliance also made sense given Groove was built mostly on the Windows platform.
Like Lotus being built on Windows gave Windows validation for its platform, Microsoft this
time was hoping Groove would validate its .Net initiative.
Microsoft had multiple reasons for pursuing this alliance. It was nervous about Groove
and they wanted to hire Ray Ozzie. They thought Groove would help validate Windows and their
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.Net strategy. They hoped Groove would help fight off the open source movement that was going
on, and help fight off IBM and Lotus.
For Groove's part, it was looking for market leverage, huge channels, and a huge sales
force.
According to Mr. Halligan, "I don't think Microsoft viewed Groove as this really killer
app that would disrupt Outlook or Exchange, but we wanted to integrate Groove with Outlook
and Sharepoint and leverage on their channels for distribution and get their customers to listen to
us. Get their product group form Outlook, Exchange and Sharepoint to work with us, so it really
made sense for Groove to partner with Microsoft."
Another reason for the alliance was that Mr. Ozzie wanted to build a platform and not an
application. To build a platform is much more expensive, you need to partner and need much
time and money. A venture capitalist will not write a check for $52 million so Groove needed a
strategic investor and only Microsoft, Oracle or IBM could afford that money for Groove. And at
that time only Microsoft was willing. At that time the company was not worth much yet,
probably around $20 million in revenues and probably it was worth about $100 million. If it
raised $52 million, that would mean a lot of dilution. The way Microsoft set up the investment
was interesting; it was not straight preferred stock. It was convertible preferred stock with a
multiple liquidation preference. This meant if all was a success and the platform was established
in the industry, both parties can make a lot of money. But if Groove didn't make the home run,
Microsoft basically would own Groove. This was a very risky strategy, a very bold one that Mr.
Ozzie pursued.
Microsoft with its investment also had first right of refusal in case Groove grew big and
would potentially be acquired by IBM or Oracle for example. This also gave Microsoft the right
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to be notified right away of any pending interest from potential buyers. So when the actual
acquisition happened later on, that was because IBM was already expressing interest and that
sparked Microsoft to go ahead and buy the company itself.
Mr. Halligan says it could not have done the alliance before or any earlier as Groove
wanted to pursue on its own to try to establish the platform and grow market share without
relying on incumbents like Microsoft. This was primarily because one loses a lot of leverage if
one has to rely on a platform partner.
"We didn't do it later because we had to do it then , we were running out of money, and
our VC already put in a lot and would have been willing to put in more but not to the tune of $52
million."
The challenges of integration were not much initially. Groove was for the most part left
alone. According to Mr. Halligan, even if Microsoft put in $51 million, since Microsoft had a lot
of partners, Groove was pretty much left independent. When Groove talked to the product groups
to collaborate, there really wasn't much interaction. Processes were no way integrated. Microsoft
helped with the finances and basically challenged Groove to establish the platform. Microsoft's
acquisition strategy has historically been to acquire smaller start-up companies that are platform
material.
The partnership did not really help Groove a lot. Though Groove pursued to leverage on
Microsoft's complementary assets, the support just was not there. According to Mr. Halligan, in
theory it made so much sense, but in reality Microsoft is so big and so spread out that it made it
difficult for Groove to leverage on Microsoft complementary assets. Especially with the way
Microsoft is structured with area managers heavily concerned with their profit and loss
performance, they will only help you out if it benefited them. And given that Groove overlapped
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and somewhat competed with Outlook and Sharepoint it was just difficult to get traction from the
different managers within Microsoft. There was also tension within Microsoft because
Sharepoint disliked Groove.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the author's
interview with Brian Halligan (Halligan, 2007)).
Acquisition Activity
ACQUIRED BY Microsoft on April 8, 2005 for $120 million
Groove wanted to be acquired because it realized at this time that it was not going to be a
major platform player and the only way the technology would survive was for it to be inside
Microsoft, IBM or in the open source community. It realized then, with the way its revenues
grew, it would take a long time for it to be a billion dollar company. And, founder Ray Ozzie did
not want to play small games.
Microsoft let Groove stand alone for about a year and a half then integrated it. It
integrated the sales force and developers, to start with. It did not rush the integration most likely
because based on experience with acquisitions like PowerPoint and Visio where it rushed the
integration; it lost key customers and employees.
Product integration took a long time. Although Groove's position in MS Office was quite
obvious, it took a long time to get everyone to agree to it.
The key challenges in integration then for both companies were to avoid high turnover
(customers and employees) and have smooth product integration.
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The merger slowed innovation though. No new features came out of Groove even now
two years after. Microsoft has very long product development cycles and efforts were focused at
integrating the product to other Windows applications, how to package it, how to price it, etc. R
& D slowed down and basically evolved around integrating Groove to other Microsoft
applications, and less about new features. And with Ray Ozzie taken out of Grove and brought
to other projects, the real driving force of innovation was gone.
(Unless explicitly stated, all quotes and data for this section were taken directly from the author's
interview with Brian Halligan (Halligan, 2007)).
Brian Halligan's Biography
"Brian Halligan spent 10 years at Parametric Technology Corporation where he worked
in a variety of sales, marketing, and channels functions. Brian's most interesting role at PTC was
in starting the Pacific Rim organization living out of Hong Kong back in 1993. Five years later,
Brian was SVP of the Pacific Rim for PTC where he built an $80 million business and had 200
employees."
"Brian spent four years at Groove Networks where he joined pre-revenue as Vice
President of Sales and grew the business to a $20 million annual rate until being acquired by
Microsoft."
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"Just prior to starting HubSpot, he spent a year as a venture partner at Longworth
Ventures where he worked with many small businesses helping them build scalable
sales/marketing machines."
"Brian has a BSEE from the University of Vermont and an MBA from MIT's Sloan
School of Management. Brian's also an occasional lecturer at MIT Sloan on the science of
selling."
(Taken verbatim from HubSpot's website: www.hubspot.com, 2007).
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The impetus for this research study was the quest to identify and categorize the factors
impacting a software start-up company's decision to pursue an alliance, acquisition, IPO or
venture capital to sustain growth. The end objective therefore was to develop a framework that
would aid software start-up companies determine why, when and how alliances, acquisitions,
IPOs or venture capital can best be leveraged to sustain growth.
Figure 4.1. A Comparison of the Nine SW Start-Ups' Chronology of Events
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The figure above (Figure 4.1) compares the nine software start-up companies studied
in this research in terms of the various growth strategies they undertook, at what frequency and
when. It is very interesting to note how each software start-up company essentially embarks on
venture capital, alliances, acquisitions or IPOs at various times and with varying frequencies. As
to what the factors were that influenced these software start-up companies to embark on venture
capital, alliances, acquisitions or IPOs at that point in time is the main focus of this study. The
source of data for analysis is not limited to the nine software start-up companies studied.
Analysis and their appropriate conclusions will also have inputs from this study's review of
related literature.
The next sections are organized by the four growth strategy types in focus for this
research study. For each of the four, the different software start-up companies that pursued and
engaged in that type of growth strategy are discussed. For each software start-up company, the
main factors leading to their decision to pursue and engage in that particular growth strategy is
identified. Specifically, why, when and how the software startup company pursued and engaged
the specific growth strategy is identified and discussed.
Kayak.com (with AOL)
The company pursued the partnership with AOL for it to be AOL's technology platform.
It was likewise interested in seeking to establish a commercial relationship with the online portal
giant. Kayak wanted to take advantage of AOL's complementary assets and technologies.
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Through the partnership, it leveraged other components of AOL's portal that added value and
enhanced the functionalities of Kayak. It was also after getting the start-up company's
product/service in front of a lot of users by leveraging AOL's customer base. Another reason for
Kayak's decision to engage in a strategic alliance with AOL included getting a credibility boost
to help it secure other deals, partners, and employees.
With or without strong IP protection, a start-up company like Kayak can still pursue and
engage in an alliance if it is backed by the potential of a very credible management team. Like
Kayak, alliances must be pursued early on to take advantage of the credibility boost which
typically declines through time.
Kayak allowed AOL to put in a minor equity investment for this strategic partnership. It
leveraged the network of their VC (General Catalyst) to secure this partnership. There was no
joint R&D between the two since Kayak was to be AOL's R&D function with respect to the
flight search space. This was primarily because as a young company, Kayak moves so much
faster and out-innovates AOL. To incentive AOL, Kayak did revenue sharing as well.
Virtual Iron Software (with Goldman Sachs, Intel and SAP)
The company opted for strategic alliances as another venue to seek further funding given
that it had no more board seats to give up and therefore could not take in any more venture
capital. The more important reasons for Virtual Iron though in pursuing and engaging in strategic
partnerships were to get a strategic "lead user" for its core product and get feedback of its beta
releases. It also wanted to get access to the latest technology of the incumbent (i.e. Intel) to
which their core product is heavily reliant on.
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Virtual Iron pursued partnerships to aid it in determining and mapping out how its core-
product fits within the marketplace of its partners, since products are complementary. It also
leveraged on the marketing activities of its strategic partner and sought to get help establishing
its core technology as the industry standard and platform leader.
Alliances, like those pursued by Virtual Iron, are significantly helpful when your core
product and that of the strategic partner's are complementary.
One must mix up the type of partners to do alliances with. Like Virtual Iron, the company
selected a vertically integrated as well as a horizontally integrated strategic partner.
Black Duck Software (with Red Hat, Intel and SAP)
Black Duck entered into partnerships with RedHat, Intel and SAP because these partners
were key customers beforehand. It pursued and engaged in alliances because these chosen
partners offered a positive industry image for the start-up company. It served as an industry
"imprintor", a mark of approval for Black Duck. The software start-up company also wanted to
leverage the networks of these partners.
The start-up company did not have any expropriation fears. They made sure that these
were all addressed explicitly in written contracts and agreements.
Vaultus (with RIM: Research In Motion)
Vaultus primarily did an alliance with RIM because this strategic partner whose core
technology is highly complementary to theirs has won the standards war and has emerged as the
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dominant design capturing majority of the consumer market (which is exactly the same market as
the start-up company's).
Vaultus wanted to get access to the latest technology from this strategic partner given that
its core product is heavily reliant on it. It wanted to become the alpha testers of RIM's latest
technologies and keep its innovation and product development up to speed with RIM's. In the
end, the start-up company wanted to have the capability to deliver new products timely to the
market.
Partnering with RIM allowed Vaultus to easily get other strategic partners given it
partnered with the dominant player in this particular market. With this strategic partnership,
Vaultus got credibility, especially important for start-up companies. Vaultus also wanted to
complement their licensing strategy with this alliance to get help in establishing platform
leadership for its mobile technology platform.
Vaultus CEO David Bimbach believes partnerships may be tough to build but are
withstanding. Given the amount of time and effort both parties have put in to a relationship, it is
easier for one to make the partnership really work versus bailing out of it.
The software start-up company wanted to derive valuable and timely strategic
information on market trends with RIM given RIM's dominant leadership in its industry.
Vaultus opted to engage in the alliance with RIM when it saw that most or majority of its
key customers have adopted the strategic partner's complementary technology. With this
strategic alliance, Vaultus aimed to expand its network to key industries its core product aimed to
penetrate.
Vaultus wanted to time the alliance early. It did so because strategic partnerships take
time to pursue and eventually establish.
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Vaultus primarily seeks to align with the big distributors of complementary products to
get leads there. The software start-up company believes that by increasing the value proposition
of its strategic partner, it is able to get traction on the sales of its core product. The company
believes that one must actively cultivate the relationship, signing the contracts is just part of the
beginning.
Since RIM as a strategic partner does not sell directly to end-users (who are Vaultus'
end-users as well), it strategically decided to ally with RIM's distribution channels as well to
leverage their distribution and marketing activities.
NetNumina (with BAE Systems and Allaire)
NetNumina pursued alliances to guarantee product development partnership.
When one declines the acquisition offer of the incumbent, and they still add value to your
start-up company, NetNumina founder Imran Sayeed believes pursuing a strategic partnership is
another option to foster collaboration. And this is exactly what the start-up company pursued.
Groove Networks (with Microsoft and Intel)
Groove Networks wanted to leverage Microsoft's huge sales force and wide reach. It
hoped to get leverage through them. It pursued and engaged in a strategic partnership with
Microsoft to get traction for its core product by having the ability to integrate this with the
appropriate Microsoft products. With the Microsoft alliance, it hoped to be able to leverage the
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software giant's distribution channels and have Microsoft customers recognize Groove's
technology.
Groove Networks decided to pursue and engage in this alliance with Microsoft when it
saw there was not enough uptake in the market to make its core product a self-sustaining and
independent platform. If the start-up company's ultimate objective is to build a platform and not
an application, one must pursue a strategic partner since this is a costly endeavor, both in terms
of the finances and effort required.
It went about its pursuit of strategic partnerships by leveraging its social network to
pursue the partnership. It also leveraged the fact that if the incumbent needs your technology to
validate their platform, leveraging on that to pursue a strategic partnership is highly beneficial.
This was the case with Microsoft.
Also, if the incumbent has a vested interest in hiring or seeking further collaboration with
key executives in the start-up company, leverage that to pursue a strategic partnership. Groove
took advantage of this fact.
Given Groove was seeking a significant amount of capital from a strategic partner that a
Venture Capitalist could not or would no longer provide, it attracted potential strategic partners
with a convertible preferred stock arrangement with multiple liquidation preferences. It also
provided the strategic investor with the first right of refusal.
One of the key lessons form Groove Networks' experience in partnering with Microsoft
is to make sure to get support and commitment from key executives and top management of the
partner so that the benefits and the ultimate value of the alliance are captured. The start-up
company must be guaranteed access to the incumbent's complementary assets so the start-up
company can take advantage of these.
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Inputs from the study's literature review:
Start-up companies typically pursue alliances to get access to the complementary assets
of the incumbent. Typically, the marketing, sales and distribution assets of the incumbent are
leveraged.
Both sides engage in strategic partnerships to help each other promote their technologies
as the industry standard. Start-up companies want to establish a strategic partnership with the
winner of the battle for the dominant design and enhance the start-up company's technology and
market position.
Start-up companies engage in alliances to share the risks and costs of innovation through
joint R&D. They also engage in alliances to guarantee the availability of products through
manufacturing partnerships.
Start-up companies are strategically positioned to engage in alliances if:
o The strength of the start-up company's intellectual property is solid. Having a
strong IP protection allows for a lower disclosure and expropriation threat.
o The start-up company has good relationships with intermediaries (e.g. venture
capitalists, lawyers, etc.) to get help in seeking the appropriate partners.
o The necessity of big investments like for manufacturing and distribution is
required to compete in the market directly.
When the products are complementary, there are more venues for strategic collaborations
between the incumbent and the start-up company.
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When a start-up company has a disruptive technology, it can extract the maximum value
of an alliance by pursuing such with the appropriate incumbent who is most likely to be
adversely impacted.
One should leverage on the backing and support of one's venture capitalists in pursuing
and engaging in alliances.
The start-up company must account and plan for the different costs involved in pursuing
and engaging in an alliance. These include:
o Search costs in locating the right strategic partner
o Costs incurred in managing the alliance versus potential partner expropriation
o The opportunity costs of revenue sharing (if any)
o The cost arising from making managers potentially complacent in developing
internal capabilities.
Lastly, the start-up company must make sure that the incumbent has the appropriate well
developed R&D to leverage on the alliance and enhance value capturing on both sides.
Acqujisitions
Winphoria Networks (acquired by Motorola)
Winphoria Networks pursued the acquisition offer from Motorola to take advantage of
the acquirer's complementary assets, specifically its huge sales force.
It opted to be acquired by Motorola as the start-up company wanted to increase its
chances in establishing its core technology as the platform leader. Even with the boost from a
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merger, one must be aware of current and future market trends and make sure this does not
interfere with the efforts to establish platform leadership. As in Winphoria's case, the expected
boost from Motorola's acquisition did not materialize due to heavy consolidation in the industry
and eventual decrease in new product introduction.
By initially partnering with potential acquirers through various collaboration efforts like
distribution agreements, Winphoria increased its chances of being acquired by the incumbent
that best adds and captures the value of the start-up company. It started its ties with Motorola
through distribution agreements.
A key lesson derived from Winphoria's acquisition experience is that one must plan well
in advance to prepare for losing control on where one wants to take its products. Once merged,
the start-up company must align with the acquirer's sales and corporate strategies. The start-up
company's core product must fit within the acquirer's product families.
The start-up company must give critical attention to differences in culture. One of the
major challenges of integration has been aligning the interests of both parties, especially from the
mid-management level downwards as in Winphoria's case.
Based on Winphoria's experience, one must plan for the impact of integration on one's
product development processes. Incumbents typically have prolonged and stage-gated product
development processes that will most likely delay and negatively impact the efficiency of a start-
up company's processes. One must plan and account for a longer time to market.
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Pyramid Digital Solutions (acquired by SunGard)
Pyramid Digital Solutions pursued to be acquired by SunGard when the company's
products were already mature and when the company had a steady customer base as well. At this
time as well, the founders were now more interested in pursuing other more profitable and
fulfilling ventures.
It was likewise interested to be acquired to help the Pyramid establish market and
platform leadership by having the ability to go after big corporate customers that the acquirer's
brand name, size and stability would facilitate.
As in Pyramid's case, a start-up company must consider an offer for acquisition only
when the valuation of the enterprise by the acquirer appropriately factors the current value of the
start-up company as well as it future growth potential. One must hold out until such appropriate
valuation is achieved. When the company's growth starts to stabilize and level-off, a start-up
company must start pursuing or considering any acquisition offers. Especially when it does not
see any upside anymore given that it has saturated its market already and has seen its upper limit
like the case of Pyramid.
Getting acquired must be pursued especially when the founders of the start-up company
begin to lose interest in running and growing the company. This is especially true for serial
entrepreneurs who want to move on to their venture like Pyramid's founders.
It is also a good time to be acquired when the IPO market is not attractive, or the when
the start-up company does not have sufficient leverage or the right profile to pull off a successful
IPO. In this case, like what Pyramid went through, getting acquired may be the best opportunity
for exiting or further growth.
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A key lesson derived from Pyramid's experience is that one must be aware that if the
start-up company has no venture capital backing, it will find it difficult to negotiate for the
maximum acquisition value. It will typically lack the expertise and savviness a venture capital
firm usually brings in.
During its integration phase, SunGard and other typical experienced acquirers do a good
job integrating acquired start-up companies. They usually employ a hands-off approach at first
before starting the integration process by phases. The founders and/or management team must
ensure though that the company's employees and customers will be taken cared. Integrating
products will go smoothly if both companies, as in this case, serve the same customers and have
the same underlying technology architectures.
If it should impact the founders' vested interests, they must anticipate the stalling of
innovation and R&D productivity especially for cases wherein the acquirer is primarily
concerned with extracting the maximum cash out of the acquired company's exiting technologies
and products. This is what happened to Pyramid after the acquisition.
A key advice from the Pyramid experience is that start-up companies must not change
how they operate or invest in R&D just because it is expecting to be bought up anyway.
Anything can happen during the acquirer's due diligence.
Open Environment Corporation (acquired by Borland)
When a company's revenues become shaky and an acquirer with complementary
technologies offers a buy-out, one must consider and pursue such acquisition. This was the case
for the Open Environment Corporation.
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One key lesson derived from this acquisition is that before finalizing an acquisition, the
founders and or the management team must ensure that the main proponents of the merger on the
acquirer's side remain for the initial years of integration to ensure it goes smooth. OEC found the
merger difficult as the key supporters of the merger and acquisition soon left Borland after the
buy-out and the new management team did not find any value with the OEC acquisition.
The start-up company must anticipate and plan accordingly for the challenges in
integration especially if both companies have very different markets, very different product lines,
very different sales cycle, very different price points and very different distribution channels. All
these were experience by OEC.
NetNumina (acquired by Keane)
NetNumina pursued to be acquired by Keane to complement its operations strategy and
thus capture more value. Having been acquired by a company that has big off-shore development
operations when the start-up company is a high-end on-shore development practice was a
strategic move for NetNumina.
NetNumina opted for the acquisition because the IPO market for its particular line of
business was not optimal. Even if the start-up company is profitable, to have a liquidity event
prime for an IPO, one must have achieved substantial revenues already.
Currently, acquisitions are the best modes of exits and/or further growth versus an IPO
given that the bar remains very high in terms of the required revenues a start-up company must
achieve. Besides, there is much overhead involved now in being a public company.
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The start-up company, like in NetNumina's case, must be prepared for the challenges in
integrating especially when both companies have different operations and business models, and
different client bases.
Integration between a very small-size company and a very large one will be challenging
as well like what happened to NetNumina. One must consider the advantages and disadvantages
of how both companies plan to integrate the hundred or so people of a start-up company to the
incumbent's thousands of employees. Do you spread them out or do you keep them as a group
and risk less exposure and knowledge sharing?
Groove Networks (acquired by Microsoft)
The founder of Groove Networks saw the acquisition as the only means for their
technology to survive given its failure to establish it as a major platform. When a start-up
company fails in its pursuit to become a major platform player, given an opportunity to be
acquired, it must seriously consider it.
One must let the start-up company stand-alone for a year and a half at least before
starting the integration process. Rushing integration is prone to failure given it is prone to having
one lose its key employees and customers. Microsoft has learned this through its past
acquisitions and employed this piece-meal approach with Groove Networks.
Product integration, though seemingly intuitive and straightforward, may take a long time
due to internal politics on the acquirer's side. This is exactly what happened to Groove Networks
when it got acquired by Microsoft. Especially in a very massive company, the acquisition may
@ 2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 114 of 155
not have the full support of the key players necessary for effective and efficient product
integration.
The start-up company must plan for a drastic decrease in R&D productivity. Big
corporate acquirers tend to focus on integrating their core products to that of the start-up's and
less on developing new features. They will typically tend to focus as well on how to package and
price the start-up's core products.
Inputs from the study's literature review:
Motivations for pursuing and engaging in acquisitions must be more than for purely
financial gains. The necessity for growth, consolidation, and beating competition, among others
must also be present. To strategically complement the start-up company's core products/services
especially with products that it finds difficult or costly to develop internally is one key factor that
should influence one to engage in acquisitions.
Acquisitions are also beneficial if one finds it advantageous to join the incumbent who
won the battle for the dominant design and thus ensure the survival of the start-up company and
its technology. One can leverage acquisitions as well to move into new markets and to align with
the current market convergence.
For those seeking to exit, acquisitions currently provide faster and better payoffs versus
an IPO given current market and economic conditions.
With respect to timing, and considering technological similarities, if the focus of both
companies is on the same technology areas, a rationalization of the R & D process is achieved. If
the focus is on complementary products, there will exist a higher possibility of achieving long-
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term synergies and economies of scale in their R & D and therefore an acquisition is more
attractive for both parties. If both are active in the same or really similar markets, they both will
win market share and achieve economies of scale in both production and distribution. Hence, an
acquisition is strategic.
In the process of being acquired, the start-up company must acknowledge and plan
strategically to account for and have the appropriate solutions for the following challenges:
o Integrative complexity due to technical incompatibilities: at the product level,
possibly due to platform disparities.
o Unpredictability of a product's performance trajectory: at the product level,
possible due to performance/technical uncertainty with the integration.
o Integrative complexity due to differences in both companies' maturity level: at the
organization level, possibly due to company differences in culture, routines and
levels of maturity.
o Unpredictability of the product's market: at the market level, basically the
product's market uncertainty given the integration.
Both the start-up company and the acquirer must agree to a flexible integration plan.
Merging various functions like operations can be done immediately, after a few years or by
phases, depending on which does not interrupt the product development process best.
Both sides must manage the challenges of integration by aligning the levels of
organizational integration, the levels of process adoption and the levels of product knowledge
sharing, with the nature of the complexity specific to the integration.
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The start-up company and the incumbent acquirer must understand the explicit tradeoffs
involved in acquisitions and the integration efforts that follow, to find the appropriate integration
strategy. Some of these tradeoffs include the following:
o A high degree of integration will enable scale and coordination efficiency BUT
may potentially disrupt routines that underlie the core capabilities and may lower
flexibility.
o An adoption of the start-up company's processes by the acquirer will preserve
codified knowledge BUT may sacrifices scale and replicability.
o Knowledge sharing does expand knowledge wealth BUT may distract resources
from key operations.
IO
Open Environment Corporation (IPO for $41.4 million)
Given optimal market and economic conditions, an IPO typically is the best outcome in
terms of liquidity and valuation. This was the case for the Open Environment Corporation. An
IPO is a very good growth strategy especially if you want to retain control of the start-up
company's direction as you scale it.
When the market and economic conditions are prime for an IPO of your start-company,
IPOs must be pursued. One should bear in mind that timing is very critical given that once you
are a public company; you are very susceptible to market reaction. The start-up company must
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time IPOs with good revenue generation. Otherwise, once earning projections are missed, the
market will hit the company hard like in OEC's case.
The start-up company leveraged the founders' reputation and credibility to obtain a
reputable IPO underwriter.
Inputs from the study's literature review:
IPOs are pursued for multiple reasons. Companies typically pursue this to raise working
capital for business development, to achieve liquidity for equity holders, to introduce a currency
(publicly traded shares) to do acquisitions or to spawn further entrepreneurship in one's
enterprise.
In terms of timing, venture-backed start-up companies first exhibit an increased
probability of exiting via an IPO. After reaching a certain plateau however, those that have not
yet exited will find it harder to pursue IPOs. This is most strongly shown with biotech and
internet companies. IPO candidates have a tendency to be chosen relatively quickly. Relative to
IPOs, acquisitions tend to reach their maximum potential further on before starting to decrease.
Later-stage or expansion investments have higher probabilities of exiting through an IPO quickly
versus early stage investments.
The start-up company must be careful not to have its venture capital backers adversely
impact the timing of its IPO. Younger venture capital firms may not wait until the market is
prime and ideal. For reputation building, they may need to signal their quality and credibility to
potential investors of follow-on funds as soon as possible opting for an earlier IPO instead
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By securing reputable venture capitalists, a start-up company increases the likelihood of a
successful IPO given that a reputable venture capital firm would grant one access to a more
reputable IPO underwriter.
Venture capital firms exert heavy influence on a start-up company's exit strategy. If a
start-up company aims for an IPO sometime in its future, it must be strategic in its dealing with
its venture capital firms. By engaging their portfolio companies in stage financing and
contractual agreements, venture capitalists are best able to monitor and control the start-up
company's eventual exit. With stage financing, venture capitalists are best able to deploy exit
options at the different financing rounds and time their exit appropriately. Contractual
arrangements provide venture capital firms specific intervention rights, exit options included.
These rights may actually allow the venture capitalist to force an exit and avoid being locked into
a start-up company's equity for a prolonged period of time.
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Kayak.com
Personal contacts in a venture capital firm significantly boost a start-up company's
likelihood of selecting that particular venture capitalist. This was Kayak's case. Kayak chose a
venture capital firm that had the knowledge and the investments into the particular industry space
that the start-up company is in. This particular scenario increases the likelihood of selecting that
particular venture capitalist for most start-up companies.
Kayak involved venture capital to seek help in business development, structure and
governance of the start-up company. It found venture capital firms necessary for it to get access
to human capital: the venture capital firm's network of top executives for potential partnerships,
access to great bankers, law firms and accounting companies.
In Kayak's experience, the certification and signaling effect a venture capital may bring
will not be that valuable to a start-up company whose founders are already established and
proven entrepreneurs. When the founders' credibility will already certify the start-up company,
this value added feature a venture capital brings in is not that significant anymore.
One must have a mix of east and west coast venture capital firms since each brings in
something different given their different mentalities, networks and capabilities. Kayak employed
this strategy. When a start-up company expands to new geographic markets, it aids seeking
funding for such expansion from a venture capitalist based in that region.
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One must perform due diligence in choosing the right venture capital firm. In each round,
the start-up company must assess and ask itself what skills does it require now and who can give
it best.
Virtual Iron Software
Virtual Iron sought venture capital money to attract employees, especially with its
reputable and known venture capital firms. Through its venture capital firms, it sought to get key
contacts and help in seeking the right people for the board.
The company brought in venture capital funding to get access to help in business
development and to leverage the venture capitalist's network to look for strategic partners. It
likewise hoped to leverage the venture capitalist's network to look for key employees for the
founding team. Having venture capital backing also allowed Virtual Iron to leverage the venture
capitalist's network to look for end users to test its technology and receive valuable feedback.
The venture capitalist's brand name brings tremendous value to a small company. It helps
certify the start-up company which aids it in procuring partners, customers and key employees.
Start-up companies, like Virtual Iron, may prefer to have more than one venture capitalist
so that not one venture capital firm will end up dominating the board and the company. Having
multiple venture capital firms also gives one the advantage of deriving different advice and thus
increases the likelihood that the best decisions are made for the company.
One must choose a venture capitalist that is not only reputable and has been around for a
while, but one that has deep social networks coupled with the knowledge of who would be a
good fit to help the company. This was Virtual Iron's philosophy.
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Black Duck Software
When a start-up company is based on a big idea that needs fuel to launch and succeed and
it cannot do it alone, seeking venture capital funding is key. This was Black Duck's case. A
venture capitalist is essential for the start-up company to get a seal of approval and be able to sell
to the enterprise.
Given that the start-up company's business model/subscription model required more
capital for it to succeed and get more traction, it sought venture funding.
Other factors that played in the start-up company's decision to pursue venture capital
included having access to get help and advice in business development, reselling and partnering,
as well having access to get help in addressing the threat of a competitor when the venture
capital firm is strategically positioned to help addressing the threat.
A start-up company must leverage venture capital early to take advantage of the non-
financial benefits it delivers like the support it renders in searching for the right people to
complete the management team.
When the start-up company does not need much fuel to start and can easily generate
revenues to sustain and grow itself, venture capital must not be opted versus angel funding or
"bootstrapping". Venture capital is not a universal paradigm for entrepreneurial ventures.
From Black Duck's experience, one must choose a venture capitalist with the right
personality and background since a start-up company is actually "teaming" with the venture
capital firm. The start-up company must choose a venture capitalist that has a lot of experience
investing in one's particular industry. It must choose a venture capitalist with the right "vintage"
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to their fund (i.e. the funds are early in their investment cycle and have a longer period left
before its closes). It must choose a venture capitalist that can "go the distance" with the start-up
company's financial needs.
Other criteria employed by Black Duck in selecting its VC included the fact that given
strategic investors are essential to most start-up companies, it chose venture capitalists that were
capable of working effectively with them. One must choose a venture capitalist that offers a
really effective hiring strategy to complement the start-up company's sourcing needs for key
executives.
Also, the start-up company should choose a venture capital firm with a great network
relevant to one's business. It must choose venture capitalists that can potentially give the start-up
company good leads and sales opportunities.
Lastly, choose a venture capitalist that is able to focus on your start-up company. It
cannot be splitting its time across too many investments. It is recommended to have no more
than four to five board seats for a particular venture capitalist to oversee.
Winphoria Networks
To tap in to the venture capitalist's network and hire the right executives to help the start-
up company execute its strategies was one key benefit Winphoria sought in seeking venture
funding.
When a start-up company is capital intensive in starting its idea, venture capital is
significantly helpful. For further rounds, Winphoria sought to leverage later-stage venture capital
firms to sustain the start-up company's growth.
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Recommendations from trusted personal contacts play a very big factor in a start-up
company's selection of venture capitalists like Winphoria's case. Founders may even wave due
diligence efforts depending on the strength of the recommendation and the trust factors.
NetNumina
Like in NetNumina's case, when a start-up company is growing fast and urgently needs
fuel, venture capitalists are a good source of capital if the start-up company wants to hold-off
acquisition offers as it plans to pursue an IPO at a later date (and it currently does not have the
revenues to support an IPO).
It chose the venture capital firm with the best track record of understanding the particular
industry space the start-up company is in, and not just the one with the best reputation. It
likewise chose the venture capital firm with the best track record of helping out start-up
companies grow in the particular industry space of the start-up company.
Groove Networks
Personal contacts in a venture capital firm significantly boost a start-up company's
likelihood of selecting that particular venture capitalist. This is how Groove Networks selected
its initial set of venture capital firms.
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Inputs from the study's literature review:
Venture capital firms offer advice and mentoring as well as the benefits of their
expansive network in industry. They typically offer guidance in strategy/product, team building,
customers/partnerships, syndication, industry analysis and exit/growth strategies. They also help
start-up companies prepare for an eventual IPO or sale.
Another benefit of private equity funding, specifically to the founders of the start-up
company, is that it can provide liquidity which allows the business owners to diversify their net
worth and therefore reduce their exposure to risk.
Venture Capital firms are shown to improve the patent productivity and human resource
practice professionalization of start-up companies given their intensive due diligence and
monitoring processes. Venture capital firms typically professionalize employment practices and
help in forming an excellent board of directors.
Venture Capitalists are shown to mitigate some of the obstacles start-up firms may have
in pursuing alliances. A venture capitalist's in-depth knowledge of the needs and capabilities of
other firms can help start-up companies find the right partner through information
intermediation. Given their reputation as trusted intermediaries backed by experience, venture
capital firms can facilitate partnership negotiations for the start-up companies.
Given their expansive network, venture capital firms aid start-up companies versus the
challenge or fear of partner expropriation. Partner misbehavior will be dealt with fast and with
negative consequences given a venture capital firm's reach. Through their vast network, venture
capitalists can also provide contacts for potential suppliers and customers to the start-up
companies.
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Given their unknown reputation and untested products, start-up companies with reputable
venture capital backing are in a way certified to be trustworthy and credible.
Start-up companies must be willing to forego offers with higher valuations in order to
affiliate with more reputable venture capital firms. Venture capital firms act more than just being
financial institutions. Their network and certification value are actually more distinctive than the
money they offer.
Having gone through the factors for each software start-up company that played a role in
its decision to pursue and engage one of the four growth strategies, the next section will compile
all of these and identify the main factors.
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TO LEVERAGE ON THE INCUMBENT'S TANGIBLE & INTANGIBLE ASSETS
" To take advantage of the incumbent's complementary assets (Sales, Marketing,
Distribution).
- To get the start-up company's product/service in front of a lot of users, leverage on
partner's customer base.
" To get a credibility boost: helps secure other deals, partners, and employees.
" To get access to the latest technology of the incumbent to which one's core product is
heavily dependent on.
- To become the alpha testers of the partner's latest technologies and keep one's innovation
and product development up to speed to theirs. Thus, have the capability to deliver new
products timely to the market.
- To determine and map out how one's core-product fits within the marketplace of the
partner, since products are complementary.
- To leverage on the networks of these partners.
- To derive valuable and timely strategic information on market trends if the strategic partner
is dominant and highly connected in its industry.
- To expand one's network to new key industries one's core product aims to penetrate.
" To acquire a positive industry image if the partner serves as an industry "imprintor", a mark
of approval.
" To easily get other strategic partners given the potential partnership is with the dominant
player in a particular market.
TO ENHANCE ONE'S STABILITY AND PROFITABILITY
" To establish a commercial relationship with an incumbent.
- To keep key customers.
" To guarantee product development partnership.
" To get traction for one's core product by having the ability to integrate one's product with
the incumbent's and have their customers recognize your technology.
- Engage in alliances to share the risks and costs of innovation through joint R&D.
" Engage in alliances to guarantee the availability of products through manufacturing
partnerships.
- To establish a strategic partnership with the winner of the battle for the dominant design
and enhance the start-up company's technology and market position.
" If there are no more board seats to offer and thus one cannot take in more venture capital.
TO ESTABLISH PLATFORM LEADERSHIP
" To promote one's technology platform to become the industry standard.
" Get help establishing one's core technology as the industry standard and platform leader.
-To complement one's licensing strategy to help establish platform leadership.
TO ACQUIRE KEY CUSTOMERS
- To get a strategic "lead user" for one's core product and get feedback of your beta releases.
Table 4.1. Alliances: The "Why" Factors.
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WHEN PRODUCTS ARE COMPLEMENTARY
- Alliances are significantly helpful when one's core product and that of the strategic partner's
are complementary.
" When most or majority of one's key customers have adopted the strategic partner's
complementary technology.
EARLY STAGES TO LEVERAGE ON BENEFITS THAT DECLINE OVER TIME
" Early on, to take advantage of the credibility boost which typically declines over time.
" The earlier, the better, because strategic partnerships take time to pursue and eventually
establish.
IF PURSUING TO ESTABLISH A PLATFORM
- If the start-up company's ultimate objective is to build a platform and not an application,
one must pursue a strategic partner since this is a costly endeavor, both in terms of the
finances and effort required. This is especially true if there is not enough uptake in the
market to make one's core product a self-sustaining and independent platform.
IF ONE HAS STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP) PROTECTION
" Having a strong IP protection allows for a lower disclosure and expropriation threat.
- Although, with or without strong IP, a start-up company can still pursue and engage in an
alliance if it is backed by a very credible management team.
IF ONE HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH KEY INTERMEDIARIES
- The start-up company has good relationships with intermediaries (e.g. venture capitalists,
lawyers, etc.) to get help in seeking the appropriate partners.
IF ONE HAS TO INVEST HEAVILY TO COMPETE DIRECTLY
" The necessity of big investments like for manufacturing and distribution is required to
compete in the market directly.
WHEN ONE HAS A DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND PREFERS NOT TO COMPETE
DIRECTLY
" When a start-up company has a disruptive technology, it can extract the maximum value of
an alliance by pursuing such with the appropriate incumbent who is most likely to be
adversely impacted.
WHEN ONE NEEDS TO FOSTER COLLABORATION WITHOUT HAVING TO BE
-When one declines the acquisition offer of the incumbent, and they still add value to the
start-up company, pursuing a strategic partnership is another option to foster collaboration.
Table 4.2. Alliances: The "When" Factors.
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LEVERAGE ON ONE'S VC
Leverage on the network of one's VC to secure the partnership.
LEVERAGE ON ONE'S TECHNOLOGY
" If the incumbent needs your technology to validate their platform, leverage on that to
pursue a strategic partnership.
ADDRESS THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS OF AN ALLIANCE
" Account and plan for the different costs involved in pursuing and engaging in an alliance.
These include:
o Search costs in locating the right strategic partner.
o Costs incurred in managing the alliance versus potential partner
expropriation.
o The opportunity costs of revenue sharing (if any).
o The cost arising from making managers potentially complacent in developing
internal capabilities.
MANAGE AND NURTURE THE PARTNERSHIP
- One must actively cultivate the relationship, signing contracts is just the beginning.
- Avoid a joint R&D if disadvantageous, typically because as a young company one moves so
much faster and out-innovates the incumbent.
" Do revenue sharing to incentive partner as well.
- Mix up the type of partners to do alliances with. Select a vertically integrated as well as a
horizontally integrated strategic partner.
- If there are expropriation fears, address these explicitly in written contracts and agreements
" Allow the incumbent to put in a minor equity investment only.
" Align with the big distributors of complementary products to get leads there.
" By increasing the value proposition of one's strategic partner, one gets traction on sales if
the products of both are highly complementary.
- If one's strategic partner does not sell directly to end-users (who are your end-users as
well), ally with their distribution channels to leverage on their distribution and marketing
activities.
MAKE SURE TO GET SUPPORT FROM KEY PEOPLE OF PARTNER FIRM
" Make sure to get support and commitment from key executives and top management of the
acquirer so that the benefits and the ultimate value of the alliance are captured. One must
be guaranteed access to the incumbent's complementary assets so the start-up company
can leverage these.
- Make sure that the incumbent has the appropriate and well developed R&D to leverage on
the alliance and enhance value capturing on both sides.
Table 4.3. Alliances: The "How" Factors.
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TO LEVERAGE ON THE ACQUIRER'S TANGIBLE & INTANGIBLE ASSETS
- To take advantage of the acquirers complementary assets like its huge sales force.
" To complement a start-up company's operations strategy and thus capture more value.
(e.g. being acquired by a company that has a big off-shore development operations when
the start-up company is a high-end on-shore development practice).
- Motivations must be more than purely financial gains. The necessity for growth,
consolidation, and beating competition, among others, must also be present.
" To strategically complement the start-up company's core products/services especially with
products that it finds difficult or costly to develop internally.
TO ESTABLISH MARKET AND PLATFORM LEADERSHIP
" To help the start-up company establish market and platform leadership by having the ability
to go after big corporate customers that the acquirer's brand name, size and stability would
facilitate.
" To join the incumbent who won the battle for the dominant design and ensure the survival
of the start-up company and its technology.
TO EXIT, SHOULD THE FOUNDERS DESIRE SO
" For those seeking to exit, acquisitions currently provide faster and better payoffs versus an
IPO given current market and economic conditions.
" The company's products are already mature with a steady customer base and the founders
are now more interested in pursuing other more profitable and fulfilling ventures.
TO SURVIVE, IF NO OTHER OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE
" When a company's revenues become shaky and an acquirer with complementary
technologies offers a buy-out, one must consider and pursue the acquisition.
- If the acquisition is the only means for one's technology to survive given its failure to
establish itself as a major platform.
TO PENETRATE NEW MARKETS
- To move into new markets.
" To align with current market convergence.
Table 4.4. Acquisitions: The "Why" Factors.
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WHEN THE VALUATION IS APPROPRIATE
" The start-up company must consider an offer for acquisition only when the valuation
appropriately factors the current value of the start-up company as well as it future growth
potential.
WHEN GROWTH STABILIZES
" When the company's growth starts to stabilize and level-off, a start-up company must start
pursuing any acquisition offers. Especially when it does not see any upside anymore given it
has saturated its market and has seen its upper limit.
WHEN FOUNDERS WANT TO EXIT ALREADY AND AN IPO IS NOT FEASIBLE
" When the founders of the start-up company begin to lose interest in running and growing
the company, it must start pursuing acquisition offers. This is especially true for serial
entrepreneurs who want to move on to their next venture.
" When the IPO market is not attractive, or the when the start-up company does not have
sufficient leverage or the right profile to pull off a successful IPO, getting acquired may be
the best opportunity for exiting or further growth.
" Currently, acquisitions are the best modes of exits and/or modes for growth versus an IPO
given that the bar remains very high in terms of the required revenues a start-up company
must achieve. Besides, there is much overhead involved now in being a public company.
WHEN THE FOCUS OF BOTH COMPANIES IS ON SIMILAR TECHNOLGIES
- With respect to technological similarities, if the focus of both companies is on the same
technology areas, a rationalization of the R & D process is achieved. If the focus is on
complementary products, there will exist a higher possibility of achieving long-term
synergies and economies of scale in their R & D and therefore an acquisition is more
attractive for both parties.
WHEN BOTH COMPANIES ARE IN SIMILAR MARKETS
" If both are active in the same or really similar markets, they both will win market share and
achieve economies of scale in both production and distribution. Hence, an acquisition is
strategic.
Table 4.5. Acquisitions: The "When" Factors.
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LEVERAGE ON EXISITING ALLIANCES TO PURSUE ACQUISITION OFFERS
- By initially partnering with potential acquirers through various collaboration efforts like
distribution agreements, one increases the chances of being acquired by the incumbent that
best adds and captures the value of one's start-up company.
LEVERAGE ON ONE'S VC
" One must be aware that if the start-up company has no venture capital backing, it will find
it difficult to negotiate for the maximum acquisition value. It will typically lack the expertise
and savviness a venture capital firm usually brings in.
PLAN WELL FOR THE CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION
- Plan well in advance to prepare for losing control on where you want to take your products.
Once merged, the start-up company must align with the acquirer's sales and corporate
strategies. The start-up company's core product must fit within the acquirer's product
families.
- Give critical attention to differences in culture. One of the major challenges of integration
has been aligning the interests of both parties, especially from the mid-management level
downwards.
" Plan for the impact of integration on one's product development processes. Incumbents
typically have prolonged and stage-gated product development processes that will most
likely delay and negatively impact the efficiency of a start-up company's processes. One
must plan for a longer time to market.
" Integrating products will go smoothly if both companies serve the same customers and have
the same underlying technology architectures.
" If it should impact the founders' vested interests, they must anticipate the stalling of
innovation and R&D productivity especially for cases wherein the acquirer is primarily
concemed with extracting the maximum cash out of the acquired company's existing
technologies and products.
- The start-up company must anticipate and plan accordingly for the challenges in integration
especially if both companies have very different markets, very different product lines, very
different sales cycle, very different price points and very different distribution channels.
" The start-up company must be prepared for the challenges in integrating especially when
both companies have different operations and business models, and different client bases.
" Integration between a very small-size company and a very large one will be challenging.
One must consider the advantages and disadvantages of how both companies plan to
integrate the hundred or so people of a start-up company to the incumbent's thousands of
employees.
" Let the start-up company stand-alone for a year and a half at least before starting the
integration process. Rushing integration is prone to failure given it is prone to having one
lose its key employees and customers.
" Understand the explicit tradeoffs involved in acquisitions and the integration efforts that
follow, to find the appropriate integration strategy. Some of these tradeoffs include the
following:
o A high degree of integration will enable scale and coordination efficiency
BUT may potentially disrupt routines that underlie the core capabilities and
may lower flexibility.
o An adoption of the start-up company's processes by the acquirer will
preserve codified knowledge BUT may sacrifice scale and replicability.
o Knowledge sharing does expand knowledge wealth BUT may distract
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resources from key operations.
" In the process of being acquired, the start-up company must acknowledge and plan
strategically to account for and have the appropriate solutions for the following challenges:
o Integrative complexity due to technical incompatibilities: at the product
level, possibly due to platform disparities.
o Unpredictability of a product's performance trajectory: at the product level,
possible due to performance/technical uncertainty with the integration.
o Integrative complexity due to differences in both companies' maturity level:
at the organization level, possibly due to company differences in culture,
routines and levels of maturity.
o Unpredictability of the product's market: at the market level, basically the
product's market uncertainty given the integration.
" Product integration, though seemingly intuitive and straightforward, may take a long time
due to internal politics on the acquirer's side.
GET KEY AGREEMENTS WITH ACQUIRER TO ENSURE SMOOTH INTEGRATION
" The founders and/or management team must ensure that the company's employees and
customers will be taken care of.
- Before finalizing the acquisition, the founders and or the management team must ensure
that the main proponents of the merger on the acquirer's side remain for the initial years of
integration to ensure it goes smooth and has the appropriate support.
- Agree to a flexible integration plan. Merging various functions like operations can be done
immediately, after a few years or by phases, depending on which does not interrupt the
product development process best.
- The start-up company must plan for a drastic decrease in R&D productivity. Big corporate
acquirers tend to focus on integrating their core products to that of the start-ups and less
on developing new features.
- Manage the challenges of integration by aligning the levels of organizational integration, the
levels of process adoption and the levels of product knowledge sharing, with the nature of
the complexity specific to the integration.
DO NOT CHANGE OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIES UNTIL MERGER IS FINAL
- Start-up companies must not change how they operate or invest in R&D just because it is
expecting to be bought up anyway. Anything can happen during the acquirer's due
diligence.
Table 4.6. Acquisitions: The "How" Factors.
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GIVEN OPTIMAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, IPOs CAPTURE THE BEST LIQUIDITY
AND VALUATION
- Given optimal market and economic conditions, an IPO typically is the best outcome in
terms of liquidity and valuation.
" To raise working capital for business development.
- To achieve liquidity for equity holders.
" To introduce a currency (publicly traded shares) to do acquisitions.
" To spawn further entrepreneurship.
TO SUSTAIN GROWTH WHILE RETAINING CONTROL
" An IPO is a very good growth strategy especially if you want to retain control of the start-up
company's direction as you scale it.
Table 4.7. IPOs: The "Why" Factors.
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WHEN THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE OPTIMAL
- When the market and economic conditions are prime for an IPO of your start-company
TIME IPO WITH GOOD REVENUE GENERATION
" Timing is critical given that once you are a public company; you are very susceptible to
market reaction. Time IPOs with good revenue generation.
TRY NOT TO MISS THE WAVE, IT MAY BE HARDER TO PURSUE IPOs LATER ON
- In terms of timing, venture-backed start-up companies first exhibit an increased probability
of exiting via an IPO. After reaching a certain plateau however, those that have not yet
exited will find it harder to pursue IPOs.
- Later-stage or expansion investments have higher probabilities of exiting through an IPO
quickly versus early stage investments.
IPOs MUST NOT BE PREMATURE JUST TO SATISFY VC INTERESTS
" The start-up company must be careful not to have its venture capital backers adversely
impact the timing of its IPO. Younger venture capital firms may not wait until the market is
prime and ideal. For reputation building, they may need to signal their quality and credibility
to potential investors of follow-on funds as soon as possible opting for an earlier IPO
instead.
Table 4.8. IPOs: The "When" Factors.
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LEVERAGE ON ONE'S FOUNDERS IF REPUTABLE
- Leverage on the founders' reputation and credibility to obtain a reputable IPO underwriter.
LEVERAGE ON ONE'S VC
" By securing reputable venture capitalists, a start-up company increases the likelihood of a
successful IPO given that a reputable venture capital firm would grant one access to a more
reputable IPO underwriter.
- Venture capital firms exert heavy influence on a start-up company's exit strategy. If a start-
up company aims for an IPO sometime in its future, it must be strategic in its dealing with
its venture capital firms.
Table 4.9. IPOs: The "How" Factors.
TO GET HELP IN BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
* To seek help in business development, structure and governance of the start-up company.
* When a start-up company is based on a big idea that needs fuel to launch and succeed and
it cannot do it alone, seeking venture capital funding is key.
" If a start-up company's business model/subscription model requires more capital for it to
succeed and get more traction.
" To get help in addressing the threat of a competitor and the venture capital firm is
strategically positioned to help addressing the threat.
" They offer advice and mentoring as well as the benefits of their expansive network in
industry. They typically offer guidance in strategy/product, team building,
customers/partnerships, syndication, industry analysis and exit/growth strategies.
- They help start-up companies prepare for an eventual IPO or sale.
" Venture Capital firms are shown to improve the patent productivity and human resource
professionalization of start-up companies given their intensive due diligence and monitoring
processes.
TO LEVERAGE ON THE VC NETWORK
" To get access to human capital: the venture capital firm's network of top executives for
potential partnerships, access to great bankers, law firms and accounting companies.
" To get key contacts and help in seeking the right people for the board.
" To leverage the venture capitalist's network to look for key employees for the founding
team.
" To leverage the venture capitalist's network to look for end users to test your technology
with and receive valuable feedback.
- Through their vast network, venture capitalists can also provide contacts for potential
suppliers and customers to the start-up companies.
TO OBTAIN A CERTIFICATION EFFECT
" To attract employees, especially if one has reputable and known venture capital firms.
" The venture capitalist's brand name brings tremendous value to a small company. It helps
certify the start-up company which aids it in procuring partners, customers and key
employees.
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- A venture capitalist is essential for the start-up company to get a seal of approval and be
able to sell to the enterprise.
" Given their unknown reputation and untested products, start-up companies with reputable
venture capital backing are in a way certified to be trustworthy and credible.
TO DIVERSIFY NET WORTH AND REDUCE RISK
- Another benefit of private equity funding, specifically to the founders of the start-up
company, is that it can provide liquidity which allows the business owners to diversify their
net worth and therefore reduce their exposure to risk.
TO PURSUE AND ENGAGE IN ALLIANCES SUCCESSFULLY
- Venture Capitalists are shown to mitigate some of the obstacles start-up firms may have in
pursuing alliances. A venture capitalist's in-depth knowledge of the needs and capabilities of
other firms can help start-up companies find the right partner through information
intermediation. Given their reputation as trusted intermediaries backed by experience,
venture capital firms can facilitate partnership negotiations for the start-up companies.
- Given their expansive network, venture capital firms aid start-up companies versus the
challenge or fear of partner expropriation. Partner misbehavior will be dealt with fast and
with negative consequences given a venture capital firm's reach
Table 4.10. Venture Capital: The "Why" Factors.
VENTURE CAPITAL
EARLY ON, TO LEVERAGE ON NON-FINANCIAL BENEFITS THAT WILL DECLINE
OVER TIME
- A start-up company must leverage on venture capital early to take advantage of the non-
financial benefits it delivers like the support it renders in searching for the right people to
complete the management team.
WHEN IT IS CAPITAL INTENSIVE TO START THE NEW VENTURE
* When the start-up company does not need much fuel to start and can easily generate
revenues to sustain and grow itself, venture capital must not be opted versus angel funding
or "bootstrapping". Venture capital is not a universal paradigm for entrepreneurial ventures.
" When a start-up company is capital intensive in starting its idea, venture capital is
significantly helpful.
IF THE PLAN IS TO PURSUE AN IPO LATER ON AND ALLIANCES/ACOUISITIONS
ARE NOT FEASIBLE
- When a start-up company is growing fast and urgently needs fuel, venture capitalists are a
good source of capital if the start-up company wants to hold-off acquisition offers as it plans
to pursue an IPO at a later date (and it currently does not have the revenues to support an
IPO).
Table 4.11. Venture Capital: The "When" Factors.
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THROUGH ONE'S OWN SOCIAL NETWORK
- Personal contacts in a venture capital firm significantly boosts a start-up company's
likelihood of selecting that particular venture capitalist.
CHOOSE ONE WITH EXPERIENCE IN YOUR INDUSTRY
- A venture capital firm that has the knowledge and the investments into the particular
industry space that the start-up company is in, increases the likelihood of getting selected.
- Choose a venture capitalist that has a lot of experience investing in your particular industry.
DIVERSIFY ONE'S MIX OF VCs
- Have a mix of east and west coast venture capital firms since each brings in something
different given their different mentalities, networks and capabilities.
* Start-up companies may prefer to have more than one venture capitalist so that not one
venture capital firm will end up dominating the board and the company. Having multiple
venture capital firms also gives one the advantage of deriving different advice and thus
increases the likelihood that the best decisions are made for the company.
- When a start-up company expands to new geographic markets, it helps when one seeks
funding for such expansion from a venture capitalist based in that region.
CHOOSE ONE WITH THE RIGHT PERSONALITY
- Choose a venture capitalist with the right personality and background since a start-up
company is actually "teaming" with the venture capital firm.
- Given that strategic investors are essential to most start-up companies, choose venture
capitalists that are capable of working effectively with them.
PERFORM DUE DILIGENCE
" Perform due diligence in choosing the right venture capital firm. In each round, the start-up
company must assess and ask itself what skills does it require now and who can give it best.
CHOOSE ONE WITH DEEP NETWORKS RELEVANT TO ONE'S INDUSTRY
" Choose a venture capitalist that is not only reputable and has been around for a while, but
one that has deep social networks coupled with the knowledge of who would be a good fit
to help the company.
" Choose venture capitalists that can potentially give the start-up company good leads and
sales opportunities.
CHOOSE ONE WITH THE REQUIRED FINANCIAL STRENGTH
* Choose a venture capitalist with the right "vintage" to their fund (i.e. the funds are early in
their investment cycle and have a longer period left before it closes).
" Choose a venture capitalist that can "go the distance" with the start-up company's financial
needs.
CHOOSE ONE THAT CAN FOCUS ON YOU AND YOUR COMPANY
" Choose a venture capitalist that is able to focus on your start-up company. It cannot be
splitting its time across too many investments. It is recommended to have no more than
four to five board seats for a particular venture capitalist to oversee.
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CHOOSE ONE THAT PROVIDES THE BEST CERTIFICATION EFFECT
Start-up companies must be willing to forego offers with higher valuations in order to
affiliate with more reputable venture capital firms. Venture capital firms act more than just
being financial institutions. Their network and certification value are actually more
distinctive than the money they offer.
Table 4.12. Venture Capital: The "How" Factors.
Having identified the main factors that influence software start-up companies when
deciding between pursuing and engaging in an alliance, acquisition, IPO or venture capital, the
next section will draw on the main conclusions of this research study.
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The identification of the different factors impacting a software start-up company's
decision to pursue an alliance, acquisition, IPO or venture capital to sustain growth is the main
objective of this research study. The ultimate goal is to develop a framework that would help
software start-up companies determine why, when and how alliances, acquisitions, IPOs or
venture capital can best be leveraged to sustain growth.
The basis for this research study's analysis and conclusions is not limited to the nine
software start-up companies studied. Analysis and their appropriate conclusions will also bear
the inputs from this research study's review of related literature.
This research study's conclusions on what the different factors impacting a software start-
up company's decision to pursue an alliance, acquisition, IPO or venture capital to sustain
growth are as follows:
Alliances.
First and foremost on a software start-up company's list of reasons to pursue and engage
in alliances is to leverage the incumbent's tangible and intangible assets. Other factors impacting
their decision to leverage alliances include the opportunity to enhance one's stability and
profitability and the opportunity to acquire key customers. Another key factor that encourages
start-up company alliance or strategic partnership formation is the need for the start-up company
to establish platform leadership.
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Software start-up companies typically pursue and engage in alliances when their products
are complementary to that of the strategic partner. They would want to engage in alliances early
on to take advantage of the benefits of the partnership that decline over time. Start-up companies
engage in alliances when they seek to establish a platform. They typically do so when they have
strong IP protection. When they have good relations with key intermediaries, start-up companies
find it easier to engage in alliances. Also, if one has to invest heavily to compete in the market
directly, start-up companies would rather pursue partnerships. When one has a disruptive
technology and one prefers not to compete directly in the market, start-up companies may opt to
pursue alliances instead. Lastly, when one needs to foster collaboration without having to be
bought or having to offer major equity, the start-up company can choose to engage in a strategic
partnership instead.
There are numerous ways software start-up companies go about pursuing and engaging in
alliances. They typically leverage their venture capital firms. They likewise leverage their
technology to seek strategic partnerships. In the process of engaging in alliances, start-up
companies must address the direct and indirect costs of an alliance. They must manage and
nurture the partnership and make sure to get support from key people of the partner firm.
Acquisitions.
Like the pursuit of alliances, first and foremost on a software start-up company's list of
reasons to pursue and engage in acquisitions is to leverage the incumbent's or the acquirer's
tangible and intangible assets. Other factors impacting their decision to get acquired include the
boost such an acquisition will provide in helping them establish platform leadership. Acquisitions
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are also pursued by start-up companies when the founders want to exit already. Start-up
companies also pursue to get acquired to survive, when no other option are available. Lastly, they
would opt to get acquired to penetrate new markets.
When the valuation is appropriate and when growth stabilizes, start-up companies
typically are more inclined to get acquired should an offer exists. When both the start-up
company and the acquirer are in similar markets and the focus of both companies is on similar
technologies, acquisitions capture a lot of value. Lastly, start-up companies pursue acquisitions
when the founders want to exit already and an IPO is not feasible.
Start-up companies leverage existing alliances to pursue acquisition offers, as well as
their venture capital backers. They should plan well for the challenges of integration. They must
secure key agreements with the acquirer to ensure smooth integration. Lastly, they must not
change operations and strategies until the merger is final.
IPOs.
Given optimal economic conditions, IPOs capture the best liquidity and valuation. It is
advantageous versus getting acquired in that one gets to sustain growth while retaining control of
the software start-up company.
One must time an IPO with good revenue recognition. The start-up company must try not
to miss the wave; it may be harder to pursue IPOs later on. Also, it should not pursue IPOs
prematurely just to satisfy its venture capital backers.
The start-up company can leverage its founders (if reputable) and/or its venture capital
firms to pursue and IPO.
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Venture Capital.
Software start-up companies seek venture capital funding for a number of factors. This
includes getting help in business development, leveraging the VC network, obtaining a
certification effect, diversifying net worth and reducing risk, and pursuing and engaging in
alliances successfully.
They typically bring in venture funding early on to leverage non-financial benefits that
decline over time. When it is capital intensive to start the new venture, start-up companies usually
bring in venture capital. If the plan is to pursue an IPO later on and strategic alliances are not
feasible, venture backing is opted by start-up companies.
Start-up companies pursue different means in deciding how to best capture the maximum
value of venture capital funding. They employ different criteria in choosing their venture capital
backers. They typically start through one's own social network. They choose one with experience
in their particular industry. They usually diversify their mix of venture capital firms. They choose
one with the right personality and perform due diligence on their VC options. They choose the
venture capital firm with deep networks relevant to their industry, one with the required financial
strength, one with the capacity to focus on them and not be stretched thin, and one with whom
they can derive the best certification effect.
As seen from the conclusions, there is no one universal paradigm to help a software start-
up company determine when it is best to pursue an alliance, an acquisition, an IPO or venture
capital. A myriad of factors specific to one's situation impacts one's decision to choose the right
@ 2007 Sergio D. Ybanez Page 142 of 155
growth strategy appropriately. It is hoped that with the guidelines presented by the framework
above, software start-up companies are best able to make the right decisions.
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BACKGROUND INFO
Company & Location
Person Interviewed & Position
Year Founded
Initial Source of Funding
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
ALLIANCES
1. MAIN QUESTION: What were the factors impacting the decision to pursue an ALLIANCE at that point
in time? (consider among others: market conditions, technology-life-cycle stage of core product,
economic/financial climate, sales growth, etc.) For each factor mentioned: Why was that important? Seek
further insights.
2. FOLLOW-UP/GUIDING QUESTIONS TO EXPOUND FURTHER ON THE MAIN QUESTION:
WHY SHOULD Software Start-Ups take advantage of ALLIANCES to sustain GROWTH?
WHEN SHOULD Software Start-Ups take advantage of ALLIANCES to sustain GROWTH?
*(consider among others: with respect to start-up financial life and their product
technology life-cycle)
HOW CAN Software Start-Ups take advantage of ALLIANCES to sustain GROWTH?
- Extent of VC Backing/Help? What were the consequences? (how + when)
- Benefits are clear: Complementary Assets access, But at what costs to start-ups?
> Locating the right partner cost
> Governing the Alliance vs. expropriation cost
> Probable complacency of start-up R&D cost
> Revenue Sharing cost
(how + why + when)
- How seek partner? With unknown reputation? Social connectedness helped? (how)
- What are the challenges here for the start-up? How to address them?
> High search costs
> Expropriation fear
> Unknown reputation, so hard to sell
> Not sufficiently developed/structured to engage in alliances
(how)
- Did VC reputation affect alliance outcome? (how)
- What are some factors that encourage/discourage alliances for startups? (why), for example:
> Strength of startup's IP (stronger IP=greater chance of alliances, low disclosure &
expropriation threat)
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Existence of relationships with intermediaries (VCs)
> Necessity of big investments like manufacturing and distribution (if investment costs
are low, better off competing in the market)
> Complementary products between startup and incumbent versus potential substitutes
> A well developed internal R&D of the incumbent: so maximum value is extracted both
ways
- Startups are small and stretched thin, and thus are not well suited to find the right partners, will
intermediaries like VC's, lawyers, accountants, etc. be of help? How & why? (how). For example:
>' These "matchmakers" often specialize in particular industries,
> Have deep knowledge of industry players (who's looking, who's trustworthy),
> Can vouch for startup's product and founders as well.
- What are other factors that encourage alliances for startups? (why)
> The need to promote core product/technology as the industry standard? (dominant
design)
> To form joint R&D's to share risks and costs of technology development
3. ENDING QUESTION: Looking back: What would you like to have done differently? Would you have
still pursued the ALLIANCE?
ACQUISITIONS
1. MAIN QUESTION: What were the factors impacting the decision to pursue an ACQUISITION at that
point in time? (consider among others: market conditions, technology-life-cycle stage of core product,
economic/financial climate, sales growth, etc.) For each factor mentioned: Why was that important? Seek
further insights.
2. FOLLOW-UP/GUIDING QUESTIONS TO EXPOUND FURTHER ON THE MAIN QUESTION:
WHY SHOULD Software Start-Ups take advantage of ACQUISITIONS to sustain GROWTH?
WHEN SHOULD Software Start-Ups take advantage of ACQUISITIONS to sustain GROWTH?
*(consider among others: with respect to start-up financial life and their product
technology life-cycle)
HOW CAN Software Start-Ups take advantage of ACQUISITIONS to sustain GROWTH?
* What are the challenges here for a start-up? (how + when)
> At the product level: tech incompatibilities, platform disparity, performance/technical
uncertainty
> At the organization level: company differences in culture, routines, maturity
>; At the market level: product's market uncertainty
How address these challenges? (detailed planning + piecemeal execution)
- When pursue an acquisition? Do you wait for tech and market uncertainty to decrease for
better "attractability" to incumbents/market leaders? (when)
- How manage integration? How address the challenges here? (how)
> How critical is it to align levels of organizational integration?
> How critical is it to align levels of process adoption?
> How critical is it to align levels of product knowledge sharing?
* What are the tradeoffs when integrating? (how) for example:
> A high degree of integration enables scale and coordination efficiency BUT can
potentially disrupt routines
> Adoption of target process by acquirer preserves codified knowledge BUT sacrifices
scale & replicability.
> Knowledge sharing expands knowledge bases BUT distracts resources from
operations.
- What are the motives here besides financial? Growth? Consolidation? Beat competition?
(why)
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- When is it best to pursue an acquisition? (when)
> If between similar technologies? Why? (e.g. Rationalization of R&D)
> If between complementary technologies? Why? (e.g. achieve LT synergies)
> If between similar markets? Why? (e.g. win market share, have economies of scale)
- What are the effects on innovation? (why + when + how)
> If between similar technologies? Why? (e.g. more rapid results from R&D)
> If between complementary technologies? Why? (e.g. develop more competencies)
> If between similar markets? Why? (e.g. reduction in R&D ops)
- What are other factors that encourage acquisitions for startups? (why). For example:
> Losing in the standards/dominant design battle
- Currently, with the trend going towards acquisitions vs. IPO's with faster & better payoffs, is
pursuing an acquisition vs. IPO's then closely related to what the market currently favors? (when)
3. ENDING QUESTION: Looking back: What would you like to have done differently? Would you have
still pursued the ACQUISITION?
IPO's
1. MAIN QUESTION: What were the factors impacting the decision to pursue an IPO at that point in
time? (consider among others: market conditions, technology-life-cycle stage of core product,
economic/financial climate, sales growth, etc.) For each factor mentioned: Why was that important? Seek
further insights.
2. FOLLOW-UP/GUIDING QUESTIONS TO EXPOUND FURTHER ON THE MAIN QUESTION:
WHY SHOULD Software Start-Ups take advantage of IPO's to sustain GROWTH?
WHEN SHOULD Software Start-Ups take advantage of IPO's to sustain GROWTH?
*(consider among others: with respect to start-up financial life and their product
technology life-cycle)
HOW CAN Software Start-Ups take advantage of IPO's to sustain GROWTH?
" Did VC increase the likelihood of a successful IPO? (how + why + when)
- Does a reputable VC mean a more reputable IPO underwriter? (how + when)
" Specific reasons for pursuing an IPO? (why), for example:
> Raise working capital for business development
> Achieve liquidity for equity holders
> Introduce a currency (publicly traded shares) to do acquisitions
> Spawn further entrepreneurship
- Currently, with the trend going towards acquisitions vs. IPO's with faster & better payoffs, is
pursuing an acquisition vs. IPO's then closely related to what the market currently favors? (when)
3. ENDING QUESTION: Looking back: What would you like to have done differently? Would you have
still pursued the IPO?
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VENTURE CAPITAL
1. MAIN QUESTION: What were the factors impacting the decision to pursue VENTURE CAPITAL at
that point in time? (consider among others: market conditions, technology-life-cycle stage of core product,
economic/financial climate, sales growth, etc.) For each factor mentioned: Why was that important? Seek
further insights.
2. FOLLOW-UP/GUIDING QUESTIONS TO EXPOUND FURTHER ON THE MAIN QUESTION:
WHY SHOULD Software Start-Ups take advantage of VENTURE CAPITAL to sustain
GROWTH?
WHEN SHOULD Software Start-Ups take advantage of VENTURE CAPITAL to sustain
GROWTH?
*(consider among others: with respect to start-up financial life and their product
technology life-cycle)
HOW CAN Software Start-Ups take advantage of VENTURE CAPITAL to sustain GROWTH?
Besides financial needs, what other benefits do you seek from a VC? (why + how)
> Improvement of patent productivity?
> Professionalization of HR practices?
> Guidance/advice in: (#15)
* Strategy/product
* Team building
* Customers/partnerships
* Syndication
* Industry analysis
* Exit/Growth strategies
- Do VC's improve startup performance? (why)
> Contribute to structure and governance?
> Contribute to business development efforts?
> Signaling/Certification effects?
- Would you have been willing to forego or did you forego of offers with higher valuations to
affiliate with more reputable VC's? (why + how)
E Would you target smaller or bigger funds depending if you are seeking early stage or later
stage investments these days? (how)
3. ENDING QUESTION: Looking back: What would you like to have done differently? Would you have
still pursued VENTURE CAPITAL?
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Source: Roberts, E. and Liu, W. "Ally or Acquire? How Technology Leaders Decide." MIT Sloan
Management Review, Fall 2001, pp. 26-34.
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